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PREFACE
The basic reason for making this study is to reach
an understanding and explanation of the phenomena that
occurred in relation to the Cyprus dispute in 19G4. As far
as the impact is concerned, the failure to obtain the poli-
tical support of the United States, Turkey's main ally, and
of a majority of the states in the United Nations marks a
turning point in Turkish foreign policy. The study seeks to
establish the interdependence of these tv/o events by arguing
that in basing its entire foreign policy on an exclusive and
excessively close political, military, and economic relation-
ship with the United States, the Turkish government v;as
singularly ill-prepared for any contingency that might in-
volve a conflict of Turkish and American interests. The
alienation she faced in the United Nations is explained in
terms of the outspoken role Turkey had assumed in pursuing
pro-V7est and pro-American policies in its relations with
the neutrals and the newly independent countries which later
formed the Third V7orld group in the United Nations.
The study focuses on the changes affected by the Cyprus
crisis in Turkish foreign policy. In order to do so, it covers
the post-World War Two years during which several definite
patterns were established. These, then, are contrasted
with
the modifications adopted after the Cyprus conflict
between
1964 and 1970.
It
Turkish Foreign Policy Throufrh the
United Nations 1960-1970
(June 1974)
Deniz Erden, B.A., Robert College
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by; Prof. Gerard llrauathal
The foreifrn policy of Turkey ii\ the post-'Vorld ".Var Two years has been
shaped most by her alliance with the West. Focusing on the sixties,
the study firbt traces the established patterns in forcifi;n policy;
second, it pieces major eriphasis on the rarai fications of the Cyprus
conflict of 1964 for Turkey; and third, it covers the chan;^;es and
modifications of policy adopted as u result of this conflict
between 1964 and 1970, la each of t)ie three phases, the analysis
is carried both at the level of general policy, and at the level
of its reflection in the United Nations.
Until the Cyprus crisis, Turkey had pursued a policy which had placed
a prcmiura on htr ties with the United States and NATO. Apart from
the fact that the nature, extent and specifics of this nultisidcd
cooperation were never critically evaluated or specifically detcr-
ained, it also encoura^^ed Turkey to enbark upon ventures that
were
not required by her needs, end iu soae cases were hurrsful
as far as
the state's interests were concerned. Assuain^/ an
overly anti-Soviet
attitude, and belittlin- the cfiorts of soae states to
aaintrd*
a ueutral forei,^ft policy .verc na jor exar.iples.
The sir;aificanco of the Cyprus crisis wa.s
that it confronted Turkey
not only with a crisis in forciirn relations, hwt also vith the
realization that her interests diifercd frow those of the United
States, and that within the United Nations she was backed only
by a handful of states. This failure to obtain the political
support of h6r auin ally, and of a aajority of states in the
United Nations ;;iarlc3 a turning point ia Turkish foreign policy,
Tlie study seeks to establish the interdependence of these tv/o
events by arguing that ia basinj:^ its entire foreic!;n policy ©n
an exclusive and excessively close political, military, and economic
relationship with the United States, the Turkisli govern:uent was
singularly ill—prepared for any contingency that aigUt involve
a conflict of Turkish and Anerican interests. The alienation
she faced in the United Nations is e>tpLiiwcd in terus of the
outspoken role Turkey had a&sucsed in pursuing pro-'vcst and pro-
Aisaerican ;)olicies in her relations with the ne trals and tlie
newly independent cor.ntrios , whi ch later formed the Thirid World
group in the United Nations.
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INTRODUCTION
A brief sketch of the foreign policies of the Repub-
lic from its inception in 1923 until 1960 will contribute to
our understanding of the Turkish participation in the United
Nations from 1960 to 1970. It will be argued that the
foreign policy of the nation evolved through two phases
guided by two principles of policy during the first four
decades of its existence. From 1923 until roughly the end
of the Second World War, policy makers adhered to the prin-
ciple of neutrality. As will be remembered, the Ottoman
Empire had participated in the first TJorld V7ar on the side
of the Germans , and was dismembered up to its inner core
,
Anatolia, by the occupation forces of the victorious states.
The next four years saw the formation of a national struggle
movement which decided not to fight for the outlying appen-
dages of the Empire, declaring instead Asia Minor as the
homeland of the Turks. In the ensuing war, the military
presence of the Greeks, the British, the French, and the
Italians were terminated. Thus, when the Republic was pro-
claimed in 1923, it was in the face of VJestern animosity.
Consequently, for the next two decades the leadership of
Mustafa Kemal worked hard to maintain a place for the new
Republic among the other nations. Their decisions in regard
to Turkey were closely linked with the existence of the state
2as well as the survival of its people. In other words, the
independent existence of the Turks and their state was the
fundamental goal.
In contrast to the shaky ties with the Western world,
the Republic enjoyed the early material and spiritual
support of its neighbor, the Soviets. In fact, a treaty of
friendship was signed in 1921 which enabled the Turks to
concentrate on their altercations with the West. This
included the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact as a party
on an equal footing with other signatories, the eventual
entry to the League of Nations once the country realized that
this organization would no longer be used as a tool of
imperialist expansion directed against itself, and use the
mechanisms of the League as well as other diplomatic nego-
tiations to settle mutual problems with Great Britain,
France, and Greece. At the same time, Turkey emerged as
the champion of regional agreements aimed at preserving the
status quo, and became the leader in the creation of the
Balkan Entente. The fruits of such endeavors v/ere reached
eventually in the form of an alliance with Great Britain and
France in 1939 although Turkey was to stay out of the ensuing
war
.
If the sovereign existence of the Republic was the
primary goal determining the policies formulated by the
statesmen, an equally demanding aspiration was the vision of
a modern, developed Turkey that has ''caught up v/ith the civi-
3lization level of Europe." Attempts at reform had a history
of two centuries in the Ottoman Empire, but they were com-
parable to those of Mustafa Kemal neither in scope nor in
nature. Ever since the Republic, there has always been
wide-ranging agreement on tlie need for reforms which are
linked to progress, but the disagreement arose on the rate
and extent of change to be introduced. VThat is significant,
however, is the strength of the desire to be on par with the
countries of Europe, and to be treated as such by the latter.
In contrast to the intial policy of neutrality, the
period from the end of the second world war up to the present
has been guided by the principle of alignment. The decision
to strengthen the ties with the West was based on Moscow's
change of heart in regard to Turkey. Betv/een March 194 5
and September 1946, the Soviet Union denounced a previous
treaty of nonaggression, and, suggesting a change in the
Montreux Convention, asked for the control of the straits
as V7ell as some land along the Eastern frontier of Turkey.
Soon after, the isolation of Turkey was painfully underlined
by the uninformed manner in which Truman approached the
question of the straits in Potsdam in July 1945. Turkish
diplom.acy went to v/ork immediately, and within a year the
policies of Great Britain and the United States were coor-
dinated with those of Turkey. Soviet pressure eased off in
the fall of 1946, and the situation was regarded as stable.
VThile Turkey v/as trying to acquire increased military aid
4from the United States around this tine, it certainly could
not have foreseen the latter 's decision to provide urgent
aid along with that given to Greece. Greece was, however,
in a critical situation, and probably the inclusion of Turkey
in the Truman Doctrine "was assured primarily because of
association with concern over Greece.
In the cold war atmosphere of the post war era, the
Truman Doctrine officially signaled that Turkey was considered
to belong to the VJestern pole. Relations with the West and
especially v/ith the United States grew dramatically, and
achieved not only a dominant but exclusive character V7ithin
Turkish foreign policy over the next two decades. Since the
Turks wanted to be the beneficiaries of the United States
military strength
.
while sitting at the doorsteps of the
Soviets, to be included in the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization (NATO) V7as regarded with utmost urgency. However,
the VJest shov7ed initial reluctance and resistance to extend
membership to this unindustrialized Mediterranean country
burdened by non-European land and sea borders with the Soviets,
a Moslem population, and an unclear status possessing
neither a fully Eastern nor a fully ^7estern character. In
overcoming this unreceptive attitude the displomatic efforts
of Ankara were much aided by the eruption of the Korean war
^George Harris, Troubled Alliance ^__Turkj^sji^Ai^
Problems in Historical PorspectivG 1^45-19 71, AE I -Hoover
Policy Studies (v;ashinqton , D.C.: American Enterprise In-
stitute for Public Policy Research, 1972), p. 26.
5which enabled the Turks to show the fighting caliber of
their army to their Western friends. In the final analysis,
the advantages to be accrued by the Turkish mein})ership
,
namely, opening another front the Soviets have to contend
with, using an outlying strategic base, and bolstering the
lagging European defense with a huge, soldier-intensive
army must have outweighed other considerations, for in 1952
Turkey became a full member of this regional defense organ-
ization.
In fact, this membership contained the seeds of yet
another regional organization, the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO)
,
for Great Britain had acceded to include Turkey in
NATO only on the condition that the latter agree to defend
the former's oil interests in the Near East. That the govern-
ment carried out this task over-enthusiastically in the
following years is in fact a manifestation of the less than
prudent foreign policies pursued by the Menderes governments
between 1950 and 1960. Even the relations with the United
States, which after the second World War constituted the
basic pillar of Turkish foreign policy, were conducted on a
level of untenableness which proved to be damaging to the
relationship itself, compromising the best interests of the
nation, and provocative in the eyes of the Soviets. It
would be legitimate to assume that, along with the political
oppression at home, the bankrupt economic policies at home
and abroad, the unenlightened foreign policy of Menderes
6played a crucial role in the development of events leading
to the first dramatic upheaval in the domestic affairs of
the Republic, the revolution of May 27, 1D60.
Turkish Participation in the United Nations
In order to become a charter meml^er of this organiza-
tion, Turkey had declared war on Germany shortly before
the defeat of the latter. Although Turkey joined other
nations in expressing genuine hope that the United Nations
would be an important contribution to the maintenance of
world peace and order, she deemed it necessary to by-pass
the organization two years later v/hen the United States aid
to strengthen the security forces was accepted under the
Truman Doctrine. ".
. . in so far as Turkey unilaterally
decided that the Soviet claim constituted a threat to the
peace and appealed directly to the United States for military
help in order to protect its security, this action was
incompatible with the spirit and the collective security
provisions of the Charter. Under Article 39 of the Charter,
the right to decide that a threat to the peace exists is
2given to the Security Council."
In general, hov;ever, Turkey has been interested in
strengthening the United Nations, preferring to settle dis-
putes in accordance with international law and the provisions
^Mehm.et Gonlubol, Turkish Participation in the Unijfced
Nations 1945-1954 (Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi,
19l;T)~; p. 163.
7of the Charter. Professor Gonlubol has studied the Turkish
reaction to the more important matters brought to the United
Nations through 1954. He concludes that Turkey had block-
voted in every important "East-West" issue, and more fre-
quently than not had aligned herself v/ith the developed
colonial states at the expense of numerous underdeveloped
and anticolonial Asian, Arab, and African ones.^ Coming
from a nation which had v/on its independence from the hands
of the same West, this record was indeed disheartening, and
would take an exacting toll later at a conjuncture of events
critical for Turkey.
Primarily, this dissertation will focus upon the
Turkish foreign policy and its reflection in the United
Nations during the course of the decade 1960-1970. Obser-
vers of Turkish foreign policy agree that the eruption of
the Cyprus conflict constitutes the most important develop-
ment during this period. To date, there has been no in-
depth examination of this crisis partly because matters
relating to the issue are still considered highly sensitive
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, access to official
documents and communications is effectively hindered.
Another reason is that although peace has returned to the
island, the matter is regarded as unsettled since the talks
between the communal leaders of the Greek and the Turkish peo
^ Ibid., p. 160.
8pies have been continuing for years without reaching a final
agreement. Consequently, it is necessary to emphasize that
in this study only a minimum attention will be paid to the
whys and hows of this regional crisis. Rather, the emphasis
will be on the repercussions of the conflict. First, the
significance of the Inonu-Johnson letters will deserve some
deliberations in so far as this exchange marks the turning
point in the Turkish-American relations. Second, an attempt
will be made to place within perspective the painful isola-
tion that faced the Turks when the Cyprus issue was brought
to the United Nations. Briefly, it will be argued that
bloc-voting, a reflection of the heavily American
oriented and inflexible Turkish foreign policy, v/as contrary
to the best interests of the nation. It v;as the Cyprus crisis
which forced the reality into the awareness of the generally
unsuspecting leaders. I'Thether this in turn led to policy
revisions observable in the Turkish vote in the United Nations
is an open question that will be eagerly pursued.
The Cyprus conflict occurred around mid-sixties. It
is hoped that analyzing the Turkish foreign policy in the
years before (1960-64) and after (1964-1970) the crisis will
highlight any trends as well as changes. At the same time,
the 1960 revolution, the related Khrushchev-Gursel communi-
cations, and the Cuban missile crisis of the early sixties
v;ill also be mentioned.
9Method and Concept
The basic model to be employed in this study will be
a variant of the so-called Rational Actor model. The classic
model assumes first, that "v/hat must be explained is an
action, i.e., behavior that reflects purpose or intuition;
second, that the actor is a national government; third, that
the action is chosen as a calculated solution to a problem. "4
Two theoretical modifications will be introduced. First,
abstaining from action, i.e., the decision not to act, and
second, explaining national behavior as departures from the
rationality norm will be given equal consideration.
The concept of national interest will be the linchpin
of this study. For students of politics the concept is
crucial yet difficult to work with. Here, the conviction
is that to formulate a universal definition of "national
interest" that could be fruitfully operationalized in v/idely
varying circumstances for different states would be useless
even if it were possible. Consequently, concentration will
be on the goals and the aspirations identified as those of
the country by its leaders: a) perpetuating the independent
existence of the Republic, b) peaceful development toward
modernization. With these main tenets "national interest"
^ Graham Allison. E ssence of Decision: Explaining
the Cuban r iissile Crisis TBostorTI Little , Brovm & Co,
iDTi)
, p. it:
10
will be treated essentially as a norm. The performance of
the government will then be explained and evaluated as approx-
imations to choices expected by the tenets of the concept.
PART I. BACKGROUND
CHAPTER I
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 1945-1960
Political Democracy: From Single to Multi-Party
From the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923
until the end of the second World War, the People's Republi-
can Party established by Ataturk and later led by Inonu,
the former comrade-in-arms of Ataturk, v/as the only formal
political organization outside the Grand National Assembly.
The regime was authoritarian, intolerant of opposition, but
remarkably free of repression or surveillance, the hall-
marks of dictatorial rule. The unity among the political
elite enabled the government to enact drastic reforms
guided by the principles of nationalism, secularism, and
modernism. This relentless drive for change must have
frustrated the traditionalist, fatalistic, and quite reli-
gious peasants. The masses were at the receiving end how-
ever, and the rigid one-party system did not provide them
with opportunities to express their viewpoints.
Inonu, at the end of the Vlar, announced the decision
to liberalize the regime, and indicated the need for an
opposition party. This decision has received varying inter-
pretations. Three cynical views hold that it was due,
first, to a miscalculation on the part of the party of its
own strength; second, to a desire to please the West at a
13
tiine when Turkey found itself isolated and exposed; third,
to direct American intervention. There might be a touch of
truth to each of these explanations. Certainly the prestige
of the United States was at its peak after victory in the
world war, and foreign developments must have influenced
the decisions of the ruling party while encouraging the
opposition. Bernard Lewis rejects the thesis that liberali-
zation was exclusively "a piece of v/indow-dressing designed
to please and flatter Turkey's VJestern allies",^ and
contends that a new generation v;hich had matured under the
intense Westernization of the Kemalist regime naturally
inclined tov/ard application at home of the liberal tradi-
tions of the West. Similarly, Dogan Avcioglu, while taking
note of the foreign pressures, thinks that the truth would
be reflected more fully if the main reasons for the relaxa-
tion of authoritarianism v/ere to be found within the domestic
conditions. He maintains that the seeds of the democratic
tradition were contained in the progressive principles of
Kemalism, and that in 1945 the right moment to actualize this
potential had been reached. He also underlines the wide-
ranging complaints among the populace due to the difficulties
brought by the War, and the harsh attitude of the bureaucracy
^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey ,
Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Oxford
University Press, 1961), pp. 313-314.
14
during the Inonu years.
^
Whatever the combination of factors affecting the
decision of the leaders of the Republican Party to liberalize
the regime, a small group within the party flanks seized
on the opportunity to form the Democratic Party in 1946.
Tv^o of the leaders of the new party were Celal Bayar
and Adnan Henderes. Bayar had served the leaderships of
Ataturk and Inonu, and by 1946 had come to represent tlie
commercial interests of the new middle class. Henderes,
on the other hand, was a lawyer better knovm as a major
landowner in the Aegean area. The Democratic Party
campaigned on a platform of unrestricted civil liberties,
laissez-faire economics, relaxed secularism, and a better
standard of living for the impoverished peasants. The
appeal of the party was enormous probably because it pro-
vided an alternative to the tv7o decades of the Republican
Party rule, and v/as not burdened by a record of past per-
formance. In four years, the party expanded its organiza-
tion from the cities to tov/ns and villages, and won an
astounding victory in the 1950 elections. With 89.3 per
cent of the eligible voters participating, 396 out of 487
seats in the Assembly went to the Democrats, and 68 to the
7Republicans
,
^Dogan Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni [The Order in Tur-
key] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1968), p. 249.
"^Kemal Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Trans_ijtic^n^o_ a_
Multi-Party System (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
r9'59)7 p. 241^.
15
The significance of this election is not so much that it
took place at all, or that it was completely free and orderly,
or that the Democratic Party was voted in by a landslide.
Rather, its uniqueness lies in the fact that the Republican
People's Party accepted the results calmly, and Inonu
assumed the leadership of the opposition. Nothing could have
been further removed from the political traditions of the
country, and it is said, this lesson in democracy impressed
the people very deeply.
The next fev7 years sav7 a normal relationship betv/een
the Democrats and the Republicans. Unfortunately, the
"honeymoon" period v^as shortlived. Although the Democrats
were returned to pov/er in the elections of 1954 and 1957 , they
became increasingly hostile toward criticism and corrupt in
management of state affairs.
Political Oppression: Corruption of the Ruling Party
Kemal Karpat things tliat enabling the Democratic Party
to come to office v/as "a great mistake in a country in
which the principles of democracy had been only barely
touched upon and the checks and balances of government's
powers had not been properly regulated."^ ^^hile the
first
part of this assertion is open to debate, it is
comr^only
accepted that the 1924 constitution, in force
until 19G0,
ill-fitted the features of a m.ulti-party regime.
Deeply
committed to the Rousseauian theory that national
will is
8lbid., p. 181.
16
represented only by the legislature, the 1924 Constitution
granted extensive powers to the National AssenLbly without
providing for the necessary checks. Furthermore, it
continued the unicameral legislative system, without the
moderating influences of an upper house. With no institu-
tional restraints, the majority party and the government
exploited the system blatantly for their o\m partisan
purposes at the expense of the basic rights of the opposi-
tion and the citizens.^
In fact, from 1954 to 1960 the defining characteristics
of the political scene was the accelerating polarization
betv/een the Democrats and the Republicans. One of the
three main issues of contention was the role of reliqion
in Turkish life.^^ By 1949, the Republican Party had come
to allow religious instruction in schools, and a Faculty of
Divinity was established for the purpose of providing educated
religious leaders. Quantitatively, the Democrats did more
on these accounts and qualitatively, they permitted the
new developments to take on a conservative coloring. Less
formally, religious publications and suppressed mystic sects
began to reappear along with more public celebrations of the
9Suna Kili, Assem}:)ly Debates on the Constitutions
of 1924 and 1961 (Istanbul: Robert College Research Center,
1971) , pp. 6-8.
^^Walter Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963) , pp. 8-11.
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religious holidays. Profoundly symbolic of the clash
between the reformist-secular and the conservative-religious
mentalities was the return to the Arabic in the call to
prayer instead of the Turkish translation as stipulated
by a 1932 law.
The second issue contributing to the polarization
of politics can be summed up as that of political freedom.
After 1953 the Democratic Party embarked on the road of
enacting laws and regulations with the purpose of restrict-
ing the independence and the power of such groups and
institutions as the press, the universities, the opposition
parties, civil servants, and the Assembly itself. Tv;o
Press Lav7s punished "the spreading of false news; insulting
or invading the privacy of public officials; damaging public
confidence in or the prestige of the government." Professors
were banned from political activity, while the government
resorted to the mechanisms of suspension and non-promotion
within the universities. In 1953, most of the assets of the
Republican Party v/ere confiscated, and in 1956, party meet-
ings were permitted only for a limited duration before elec-
tions. Civil servants learned that they could be dismissed
without having the right of appeal. In preparing for the
1957 elections, a new lav; prohibited coalitions, and stipur
lated that any party winning the "most" votes in a province
would receive the entire number of deputies of that province.
The same year, the questioning of ministers by deputies was
18
limited in a series of restrictions on the Assembly itself.
Finally, the official results of the elections were never
published, feeding the charges that they were rigged.
It was inevitable that such a repressive regime
would bring disaster upon itself. Although the military
intervention was touched off by a further series of critical
developments, there was a third major issue which contributed
not only to the polarization between the Democrats and the
Republicans, but also to the rapidly worsening prospects of
the country.
The Economy: From Etatism to Laissez-Faire to Bankruptcy
For centuries, the capitulations, the system which
held the V7estern citizens immune from Ottoman jurisdiction
and permitted them to live under the jurisdiction of their
own consuls , had led to the economic exploitation of the
Ottoman economy, obstructing the latter 's resurgence, and
restricting the state's rights of sovereignty over its land.
Ever since the foresighted Lausanne treaty which met the
demands of Ataturk for complete political, juridical, and
financial independence, the successive governments of the
Republic have been extremely cautious in their economic
relations with foreign states. This closed policy of the
Republican Party governments toward outside capital was
supplemented by the adoption of etatism at home. Not only
did Turkey lack a class of entrepreneurs to bring about the
19
necessary developments, but political leaders also doubted
the willingness of the private sector to finance costly
long-term investments,
J^eutral during the viar
,
Turkey cairte out of the crisis
vrith all foreign debts paid, and with a considerable stock
Of gold and foreign currency . "'•^ It was at this point that
the Soviets started to pressure their southern neighbor,
a major and counterproductive blunder in terms of their
(designs on Turkey. This led to the Turkish-American
alliance which was promptly reflected in the economic policy
of the nation. "There is no doubt," writes Bernard Lewis,
"that American pressure was exerted rather strongly in favour
of private enterprise and against etatism, and the moves of
the People's Party government in this direction were no
doubt due in large measure to the terms of American loans
and the advice of American advisers." The aid received
under the riarshall plan (1948-1951) v/as prescribed for the
development of agriculture so that Turkey could supply a war-
torn Europe with food and raw materials in return for which
she could buy the industrial products of the Western states.
This clear break from the principle of Ataturk that
political independence required a self-sufficient industrial
base was accelerated by the Menderes governments which were
^^Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni , p. 276.
^^Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 315.
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fe^i.?^ted to the promotion of foreign and private invest-
faents. Between 1950 and 1953 agricultural credits for
peasants and infrastructural projects like road building
enabled the country to take a sigh of relief. However, as
the government had an aversion to the concept of planned
it inevitably overextended its activities in
relation to its resources. The gaps between revenues and
expenditures were filled simply by printing more money,
while the resulting acute inflation and insolvency were
^ased periodically by receiving massive doses of foreign
ai^, (^specially from the United States.
Deficit financing finally brought the economy to a
^mplete standstill in 1958. The V7estern allies agreed to
Ipail Menderes out through an International Monetary Fund
loan of $359 million. In v;hat was called a Stabilization
Program the prime minister agreed to devalue the Turkish lira,
impose a set of restrictions on, and strive toward coordina-
txon of investment. Shortly afterwards, even half-hearted
^tempts to attain a sensible financial balance were aban-
doned as Ilenderes slipped back to his habit of cutting
ribbons at showy and unnecessary projects across tlie country.
Financial chaos accompanied by political repression
and religious polarization v;ere enough to force the hand of
the army v/hose devotion to the principles of Ataturk con-
tributes to its well-developed sense of responsibility for
the v/elfare of the Republic. The discontent led to actual
21
interference in a final sequence of events in the final
months before May, 1960.
Tv7enty days after the May 1960 revolution, to be
discussed belov;, it was revealed that the internal and
external debts facing the country amounted to a grand
total of $1,354,604,636.^^ The unprecedented scale of
this bankruptcy prompted the revolutionary leadership of
National Unity Committee to launch a program of deflationary
austerity measures which succeeded in a year to balance
the budget and to restore price stability and the confidence
of foreign creditors in extending aid. Perhaps the most
important economic achievement of the military leadership
v/as the establishment of the State Planning Organization.
The '60 Revolution: Return to the Rule of Lav7
Amid rumors that the government vrould call new elec-
tions a year ahead of time, the Democrats passed a law in
April 1960 establishing "the Committee to Investigate the
Activities of the Republican Party and a section of the
Press." The Committee was formally granted v/ide pov/ers
ranging from a ban on political activities supported by
penalties to the suspension of civil service, penal, and
judicial laws. The law and the expulsion of the protesting
Inonu from the Assembly led to immediate student riots in
the Istanbul and Ankara Universities countered by policEand
13Weiker, Turkish Revolution, p. 12.
soldiers instructed to fire. Martial law was declared and
most newspapers and magazines suspended, while universities
were closed and students sent off to detention camps. The
final v/arning came from one thousand cadets of the Military
College and their officers when they marched across
Ankara singing military marches. Six days later, on May 21
,
the Menderes era was terminated by a military overthrow.
The revolution was completed in four hours with no
bloodshed. The National Unity Committee, composed entirely
of revolutionary officers, ruled the country for; the next
seventeen months. Hov/ever, immediately after the takeover,
the military asked for the help of the university professors
who v/ere asked not only to serve in various positions in the
operations of the government, but also v/ere exclusively
responsible in formulating the new constitution.
The 1961 constitution provided for liberal provisions
on fundamental rights, and incorporated the idea of a wel-
fare state. Furthermore, it introduced new legal-political
institutions such as the upper house (Senate of the Republic)
,
the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Council of the Judici-
ary, and the State Planning Organization. Another major chang*
was the adoption of a nev7 electoral system based on propor-
tional representation. The varying drafting committees
worked within a Constituent Assembly. In January 1961, new
parties v;ere allov/ed to organize. Six months later, the new
constitution was approved in a national referendum v/hich was
23
followed by the election of October 1961, and the return
to civilian rule.
During the seventeen months of the National Unity
Committee rule, the trial of over 400 leaders of the
Democratic Party government was one major event. It lasted
eleven months, watched closely at home and abroad. "Foreign
legal observers at the trials at various times were unani-
mous in their praise and in their amazement that in the
heavily charged political atmosphere Basol (the head of the
High Council of Justice) was able to keep the trials orderly,
surprisingly fair, and with a minimum of political propaganda
from any quarter."-'-^ IThen the verdicts were delivered,
there were four death sentences by unanimous vote of the
judges, and eleven by majority vote. The National Unity
Committee commuted the death sentences of all except three,
approving the difficult decision to send to the gallows
prime minister Menderes, foreign minister Zorlu, and
finance minister Polatkan.
The elections were held a month later, and with 82%
of the eligible voters casting ballots, no one party won
control of the legislature. In the ensuing four years,
three coalition governments were formed each with different
combinations among the parties: the Republican Party, the
Justice Party, unofficial heir of the dissolved Democratic
^^Ibid.
, p. 27.
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rParty, and the smaller new parties also catering to the
cex-Democratic votes. In the 1965 and 1969 elections, the
•Justice Party received enough votes to muster about 53%
cof the 450 seat Assembly in 1965 and 56% in 1969.
The mutual interaction between domestic and foreign
^policies of any given state is a complex phenomenon. Domes-
jtic developments are inextricably tied with the elements
cof national goals, geopolitical considerations, and uncon-
-.trollable external events, all of which contribute to what
•we call the process of foreign policy formation.
In the case of Turkey between the years of 1945 and
1960, the liberalization of the one-party regime, the
ifree elections of 1950 with results respected by the losing
:side, the thought provoking spectacle of a rigorous new
•party regrettably abusing its pov/er and thus bringing the
ccountry to the brink of disaster in six short years, the
lintervention of the army to protect the welfare of the Re-
public arising from a sense of responsibility, yet necessi-
itating the abandonment of its traditionally unpolitical role
(if only for a limited period) , and the sobering effects of
holding the political leadership of the past decade to account
for its performance, have been significant experiences within
the developing political culture of the Turkish people.
For based on their political consciousness the leaders and
-the citizens embarked, in a matter of a few years, upon a
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deep-reaching process of evaluation and criticism of internal
and foreign national policies.
Further, it is in this sane period fror. 1945 to 1960
that Turkey, seeking political support as v/ell as economic
and military aid from the West, was favored especially by
the United States due to world political developments which
placed a premium on Turkey's geographical location. Under
the Menderes governments Turkish-Zunerican relations assumed
an exclusively privileged character. In return for total
Turkish acceptance of its policies, the United States
financed Menderes 's spending, equipped the Turkish army,
and supported the regime. In short, the T^jnerican policies,
presence, and aid on the one hand, and the Menderes govern-
ments on the other, came to be identified with each other,
at least in the minds of the educated Turks. Consequently,
when Menderes dragged the country and himself into a sorry
mess, the United States found itself enmeshed in the sam.e
lot. Ilov/ever, anti-?jnericanism did not begin until four
years after the 1960 Revolution. Just as the latter
enabled the people to criticize Menderes 's domestic policies,
so the Cyprus crisis of 1964, to be discussed in Chapter IV,
served as the spark which initiated an extensive re-evalua-
tion of "the American element" within Turkish foreign
policy.
CHAPTER II
PATTERNS OF FOREIGN POLICY 1945-1960
Major Policy Developments
The end of the second World War also marks the end
of Turkish neutrality, the guiding principle of previous
policies. It is possible to study the events of the next
fifteen years, all developing within the framev/ork of
the Turkish-Western alliance, in three conceptual categories.
Using as our criteria the needs of the state stemming from
the three accepted goals of the Republic: a) independence
and territorial integrity; b) economic development; c) a
modern, "European" status; then compare and contrasting
such needs with those of Turkey's allies in each of the major
developments of the era, we obtain the following grouping:
1) Policies entirely corresponding to Turkish needs; 2) Pol-
icies that have not originated from primary Turkish
interests but fulfilling crucial needs of the West; 3) Poli-
cies detrimental to Turkish interests and encouraged by the
V7est
.
The Turkish search for and acceptance of Western aid
constitutes the first category of policies advantageous to
both sides. The Truman aid, formalized by the "Aid to
Turkey Agreement" signed by the United States and Turkey in
1947, the joining of the Council of Europe in 1949, and NATO
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in a952 were policies which all contributed to the security,
development, and status goals of Turkey. On the other side,
^tl^e United States and the V7estern European countries were
furiously concerned, at the time, about the progress made
the Communist parties of Eastern and Central European
.States, followed by the establishment of the Cominform.
Europe faced a clear imbalance of pov/er around this time
^hile the situation in Yugoslavia was considered perilous.
The United States was the first to come to the conclusion
that the defense of the southern corner of Europe had to
be fortified. However, the European mem})ers of the
Atlantic Alliance showed initial reluctance and resistance
^9 pxtend membership to Turkey, a non-industrialized Mediter-
ranean country burdened by non-European land and sea borders
yith the Soviets, a Moslem population, and an unclear status
possessing neither a fully Eastern nor a fully Western charac-
ter . In overcoming this unreceptive attitude, the diplomatic
efforts of Ankara were aided greatly by the eruption of the
Korean war which enabled the Turks to show their willingness
to fight for a cause also supported by their Western friends.
In the final analysis, the advantages to be accrued by
Turkish membership in NATO, namely, opening another front
the Soviets had to contend with, using an outlying strategic
base which could expose the Caucasian oil and the Ural indus-
try to pressure, and bolstering the lagging European defense
with a huge, soldier-intensive army must have outweighed other
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considerations for in 1952 Turkey became a full member of
this regional defense organization.
Following the NATO agreement, the military cooperation
between the United States and Turkey were complemented
by a series of bilateral agreements. These controversial
agreements dealt with the different facets of the
military relationship. Outstanding issues were the joint
defense radar installations, cooperation between the Tur-
kish and American Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, certain
airfields with joint defense forces, and the jurisdictional
status of American soldiers, civilians, and organizations.
A few of these v/ere ratified by the Turkish Assembly, and
published in the press. Thus, the status of Forces Agree-
ment of June 1954., granting immunities and privileges to
all American government personnel and their dependents (apart
from the diplomatic corps) , had received full exposure.
Some others took the form of verbal understandings, not only
filling in the gaps left by formal agreements, but also
enlarging the sphere of American activity by giving permission
to operate the T^erican armed forces postal system, and
authority to open schools for the dependents of American
1 5personnel
.
Most crucial, however, were a series of secret agree-
ments, none of which were ratified by the National Assembly.
15Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 55.
29
It wasn't until the end of the Menderes regime that
the opposition began to challenge the constitutionality of
these "executive agreements." Six years later when the
American response to the Cyprus conflict caused severe
disappointment among Turkish circles prompting a major re-
evaluation of this relationship, the bilateral agreements
became the focus of much critical attention. Speaking at
a press conference in 1970, prime minister Demirel disclosed
that "over the 25 years of the alliance, 91 bilateral
agreements had been signed and 54 of them had been in
force when the Justice Party had come to power in October
1965."^^ Taken together, they are illuminative of the
errors committed in the name of an alliance between a small
state with specific defense considerations, and a superpower
with much wider interests.
A second group of policies can be described as those
that had not originated from Turkish needs but fulfilled the
expectation of her allies. These can regionally be divided
into two: the Balkan and the Middle East policies. Soon
after acquiring membership in NATO, Turkey and Greece were
encouraged by the United States to form a pact with Yugo-
slavia in order to stabilize the precarious situation of the
latter. The ensuing Balkan Defense Pact of 1954 among the
three countries, however, was politically short-lived, al-
^^Ibid.
, p. 229.
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though technically it was to be in effect until 1974.^7
Primarily responsible for this outcome were the problems,
first, of harmonizing the defense needs of Yugoslavia
and the NATO commitments of Greece and Turkey, and second,
the basic differences of foreign policy orientations typi-
fied by the Turkish preference for exclusive VJestern ties,
the Greek combination of a more independent attitude recog-
nizing the status of the neutrals, and the Yugoslav deter-
mination to stay clear of any East-West contest. A specific
disagreement was the interpretation of the change in Soviet
foreign policy following Stalin's death. In any case, the
1954 Pact was considered lifeless by the end of the decade.
The developments in the Middle East region, on the
other hand, have elicited deeper involvement by Turkey than
those in the Balkans. Most importantly, Turkish performance
in the Middle East during the 1950 's has been a significant
contributor towards the country's international image.
Briefly, there have been three major developments: a) the
Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO) ; b) the Suez invasion;
and c) the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The
origins of the Baghdad Pact lie in the Turkish acceptance
to play the lead in creating a post-World War II, pro-
VTestern alliance in the petroleum rich Middle East as a con-
dition to secure British approval of her membership to NATO.
^^Ferenc Vali, Bridae Across the Bosporous: The Foreign
Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Jolins Hopkins Press, 1971) ,p. 200,
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Actually, however, the moving force behind the pact became
the United States, intent on establishing a chain of
defense organizations directed against the Soviet Union.
A mutual defense treaty between Turkey and Iraq (19 55) served
as the nucleus to which Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain
acceeded the same year. The United States, while participat-
ing in the committee work and meetings, preferred not to
become a formal member. in order not to further alienate the
anti-pact states of the region, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Israel on the one hand, and not to provoke the Soviet Union
on the other.
It is difficult to understand the military reasoning
behind the Baghdad Pact. At the time, there were no Soviet
advisors in Syria, Iraq, or Egypt, and no concentration of
Soviet ships in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, of
the two regional states bordering the Soviets, Turkey was
already covered by NATO, and Iran was pro-West. The third
regional and the only Arab state, Iraq, hoped that the pact
would bring increased economic possibilities, a position of
additional strength vis-a-vis Israel, as well as a possible
position of leadership in the Arab world. Pakistan, mean-
while, eyed the pact as a means of getting the upper-hand
18
TVhmot Esmer et al., Olaylarla Turk Pis Politikasi
1919-1965 [Events of Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-1965]
,
Ankara Universitesi Siyasi Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari,
No. 279, (Ankara: Sevinc Matbaasi, 1969), p. 274.
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in its dispute with India over Kashmir. In short, there were
no threats of direct Soviet aggression to necessitate a
defense organization in the Middle East. Even if there were,
the combined military power of the regional signatories,
excepting Turkey, was almost negligible. As far as Turkey
was concerned, she could neither expect military support
from the pact, nor contribute to it while all but two of
her divisions were committed to the NATO command. If there
was no Soviet military threat, there were, however, vested
economic and political interests in the Middle East. V7ith
the British and French withdrav;al at the end of the War,
the resulting power vacuum vjas hardly compatible with exten-
sive British oil-investments in the area. On the other
hand, the United States probably aimed at keeping the area
under Western influence, and linking NATO with the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization by the Baghdad Pact.
It ought not have been surprising that this ill-
conceived cooperation would bring unexpected results.
Turkey and her allies soon realized their failure to read
the strength of the new Arab nationalism. Egypt bitterly
denounced the pact, and the Turkish role in initiating it.
The Arab world's condemnation of Turkey as the tool of
Western colonialism was echoed in the criticisms from India.
In a different vein, Israel claimed that the pact was also
directed against herself. The strain in Israeli-Turkish
relations v/as further aggravated when Turkey recalled her
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ainbassador in Tel-Aviv in order to appease the Arabs, but
unsuccessfully. Internationally, the most significant
outcome was the introduction of the Soviet presence to the
Middle East. The latter was almost forced to counter the
V7estern initiatives, and indeed, arms shipments began to
reach Egypt the same year. Thus, Turkey had unnecessarily
provoked the neighbor it feared most, besides acquiring
the image of a lackey of Western imperialism.
The second major development in the .Middle East was
the 1956 Israeli attack against Egypt, followed by the
French-British invasion of the canal zone. Although Turkey
had nothing to do with the crisis directly, it was another
blov/ to both her and the Baghdad Pact's image. Turkish
press and politicians as well as the representatives of
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan (all pact members except
for Great Britain) strongly denounced the aggression,
reiterating their support for the 1947 resolution of the
United Nations concerning Palestine. It can not be denied,
hov/ever, that the event marked another demerit for Turkish
diplomacy
.
The situation created by the gaffes of Britain and
France were fully exploited by the Soviets whose prestige
was enhanced considerably in Egypt and Syria. In order to
counter this, the United States launched in 1957 a diplomatic
offensive knovm as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Under this
formulation. Congress authorized the President to send 7aneri-
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can forces, along with economic and military aid, to
nations requesting such assistance. Prior to the applica-
tion of this new policy, hox^ever
, the contest between the
two super states grew sharper over the strained Syrian-
Turkish relations. Because these neighbors shared a long
border, Turkey follov^red with apprehension the progress of
the Syrian left. There was a heated exchange of notes
with Syria which had charged Turkey with massive troop
deployments along the border. Turkey issued a denial,
the Soviet Union threatened Turkey with retaliation, and
the United States reiterated its defense commitments
to Turkey. The conflict proved to be short-lived, and Tur-
kish fears subsided when Syria and Egypt formed the United
Arab Republic, an alliance much less threatening than a
Soviet-Syrian one.
In the same eventful year of 1958, a revolution in
pro-Western Iraq brought down the monarchy. The next days
American troops landed in Lebanon upon the invitation of
President Chamoun, and two days later Jordan asked and
received similar assistance from the British. The Baghdad
Pact members officially expressed their pleasure at this
exemplary crushing of "communist" inroads in the Middle East.
Turkey's unconditional endorsement of this joint-venture
was in fact much more involved. When it was learned that
the United States had utilized the Incirlik air base
(southern Turkey) during the Lebanese intervention, there
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was an outburst of domestic and foreign criticism directed
at the Menderes government. VThat had happened was that a
NATO base, set up for the purpose of defending Turkey
against any Soviet aggression, had been utilized by the
Americans with Turkish approval, in order to enhance Ameri-
can interests in a conflict which did not involve Turkey
in any manner. As far as tracing criticisms of foreign
policies are concerned, the following remark by the opposi-
tion leader is noteworthy: "... This is what v;e want to
know: Have the American troops come to Adana [the tovm
where the base is located] on our government's invitation,
or have they applied for the permission of our government? "^^
Such criticisms were, in 1958, mostly directed against
the government rather than the United States. A year later,
the opposition v;as once again irritated by a new bilateral
agreement between the United States and Turkey (the same
agreement was acceded to also by Iran and Pakistan, the
other members of the Baghdad Pact renamed the Central Treaty
Organization, following the v/ithdrawal of Republican Iraq)
.
The United States obligated itself to assist these countries
with her armed forces in case of an aggression. Turkey al-
ready having had such guarantee under NATO understandings,
what fostered attention was a new phrase in the preamble
noting the determination of the parties to resist "direct or
^^Ibid.
, p. 326.
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indirect aggression . "20 m view of the domestic developments
Pf the last few years (Menderes persecuting his opposition,
placing restrictions on press and political activities)
, the
opposition thought that Menderes intended to ask for American
assistance to stifle it. "Unaccountably, the government
fueled these fears by refusing to define the offending terra
on the grounds that its meaning had been worked out in
secret negotiations with the United States. Foreign minister
Zorlu later added that an imprecise definition was necessary
to cover new forms of aggression—a not v^7holly reassuring
explanation to the opposition. "^l
It was mentioned above that the events of the fifteen
y«ar period between 1945 and 1960 could be studied in three
conceptual categories. Moving now to the third group of
policies advocated by Turkey, namely those that were detri-
mental to Turkish interests and encouraged by the VJest, two
sub-sections would define the group: a) Policy toward
the Soviet Union, and b) Policy toward the neutrals.
As far as the post-war Soviet-Turkish relations are
concerned, the 1945-1946 Soviet demands for the control of
the Straits and return of some eastern territories have been
20Ismail Soysal, Turkiye'nin Pis Munasebetleriylo
ilgili Daslica Siyasi Andlasnalari [The Major Political
Agreements Concerning Turkey's Foreign Relations]
,
Turlciye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari, (Ankara: Turk Tarih
Kurumu Basimevi, 1965), p. 459.
2
1
Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 69.
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most decisive in shaping the Turkish policy for the next
fifteen years. Based on historical experience, it was
natural for Turks to be deeply frightened by such pressures,
and to seek alliances with the Uest to lessen the disadvan-
tages of their exposed location. In doing so, however, a
major error was coimitted in abandoning moderation, reflec-
ting in fact, a lack of consideration for the long-term
interests of the state. Instead of realizing and respecting
the sensitivities the Soviets might have as a result of
their superpower status, Turkish leaders did not hesitate
to embark upon measures v/hich were not only unv/arranted by
the security and economic goals of their country, but also
were clearly provocative in Soviet eyes. Fortunately for
the Turks, the new leadership after Stalin regretted the
previous mistake of scaring the Turks into a staunchly
anti-Soviet alliance, and beginning in 1953, bent over back-
wards in order to nurse Turkey to a less paranoid perspective
The Soviets were critical of the Truman aid as v;ell
as the NATO and the Tonerican bases in Turkey. Moscow
pointed out that Turkey had no place in what it considered
an offensive, Atlantic alliance. Similarly, it denounced the
British idea of a Near East command. A major reversal of
attitude by the Soviets occurred in 1953. They issued a
text reviewing Soviet-Turkish relations, and stated in
part: . . the Governments of Armenia and Georgia have
found it possible to renounce their territorial claims on
38
Turkey. Concerning the question of the Straits the Soviet
Government has reconsidered its former opinion on this
question and
. . .
declares that the Soviet Union has not
any kind of territorial claims on Turkey. "22 This major
shift v;as in line with a new phase in Soviet policy declared
to be dedicated to peaceful coexistence and economic rather
than military competition. For Turkish politicians, this
was only a change of tactics, and their response was less
than enthusiastic. World peace was indivisible; the security
needs of Turkey v/ere identical with, and could not be
separated from those of NATO.
The Soviets continued their peace offensive by top-
level speeches, through the radio, press coverages, and in
notes to TVnkara during the next seven years. In 1956,
the press stated the NATO could not form an obstacle to the
rapprochement between the two countries, and asked for
improvement of economic relations. Both of these were new and
important elements along the impetus for detente. Relations
were strained once again during the 1956-1958 Middle East
developments, but Moscow was quick to ease its pressure.
Moreover, the Russian reactions to reconaissance balloons
from, and Jupiter missiles in Turkey were rather soft. Tur-
2 2Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus
,
p. 174.
2^Esmer et al., Olaylarla Dis Politika, pp. 417-446.
39
:J^ey ignored and was encouraged to ignore all these overtures
.until she realized that preparations for a summit meeting
between the United States, Great Britain prance and the Soviet
Union meant a relaxation of tension in East-West relations.
Out of phase with the rest of NATO, she then sought to better
her ties with the Soviet Union, hoping especially for
^economic cooperation
.
Turkey has followed an equally narrow-minded policy
toward the non-aligned countries of the world. This again
has been a reflection of the "We will take whatever America
^ives, accept v/hatever she does ""mentality of Menderes.
An outstanding example of the attitude tov/ard the non-
committed nations of Asia and Africa was the 1955 Bandung
^Conference. In the emerging rift between the pro- and anti-
West components, Turkey, followed closely by Iraq and Pakis-
tan (all members of the nev; Baghdad Pact)
,
championed the
Western side. In fact, the clash was led by the Turkish
foreign minister on one side, and Nehru of India on the other.
Dismissing neutrality as a third alternative, Turkish politi-
cians generally belittled those pursuing such a course.
After joining NATO Turkey has manifested this policy most
systematically within the confines of the United Nations.
25
^^Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni
, p. 282.
^^Esmer et al,, Olaylarla Pis Politika, pp. 291-295.
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Initial Interpretation of the United Nations
Turkey acquired the privilege of becoming a Charter
member of the United Nations by bowing to Anglo-Saxon pres-
sures to abandon its neutrality and delcaring war against
Germany shortly prior to the end of hostilities in 1945.
The new world organization was perceived to be the work of
the victorious democracies. T'ji upsurge of goodwill and
enthusiasm on the part of the Turkish government, the
press, and the people accompanied its establisliment
. They
pointed out the similarities between the principles declared
in the Charter and those tliat v;ere set forth by Ataturk in
the National Pact.^^ ^he espoused "collective security"
was v/ell received, for Turks v/ere anxious to see the preven-
tion of acts of aggression. However, the veto power of the
major states v/as taken as a sign of the privilege attached
to the great pov/ers and to the Security Council at the expense
of the smaller states and the General /isceml^ly. Turkey, there-
fore, submitted amendments to increase the num]:)er of non-
permanent members of the Security Council. Another amendment
sought to keep the recommendations made by the Security Coun-
cil from interfering with legal procedure in the case of a
dispute already submitted for legal settlement. Turks also
^^Institute of International Relations of the Faculty
of Political Sciences at the University of Ankara, Turkey
and the United Nations , National Studies on International
Organizations (!Jew York: iManhattan Publishing Co. for the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1961), p. 75.
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proposed the inclusion in the Charter of some reference to
principles of right and justice in maintaining peace and
security so as "to provide a safeguard against the settle-
ment of international questions on the basis of the kind of
political expediency practiced at Munich in 1939 . "27
Enthusiasm for the organization started to dampen
as the polarization of the world crippled its functioning.
Disappointments grew over the meager results achieved in
settling the problems in Iran, Greece, Palestine and
Indonesia. It v;as observed that important problems
were discussed outside the United Nations among the major
states. Too, the great pov;ers were criticized both for
ignoring the purposes and principles of the organization
and for using it as a means to enhance their own political
goals. Such pessimism notv;ithstanding, it v;as generally
agreed that the United Nations v;as an asset to the interna-
tional community in so far as it provided a permanent forum
where nations could at least attempt to elaborate on solu-
tions to problems, and in the process, define world public
opinion
.
Compatibility of Major Policy Developments and the Charter
Legally, key developments in Turkish foreign policy
^^Gonlubol, Participation in the United Nations
,
p. 4.
^^University of TVnkara, Turkey and the United Nations ,
pp. 92-94.
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have been in compliance with the principles of the Charter.
Acceptance of the Truman aid, joining NATO, initiating
regional cooperation arrangements like the Balkan treaty
and the Baghdad Pact have all had their basis in tlie need
for attaining a degree of security for the country. Turkey
felt that it could not rely entirely on the ineffectual
mechanisms of the United Nations. Even at the San Francisco
Conference in 194 5, the delegate emphasized that collective
security referred to regional arrangements providing for
automatic action as long as the action v/as of a defensive
nature. Turkey has regarded the treaties it signed with
the V7est as vehicles aimed at coordinating the exercise of
the right of self-defense specifically recognized in Article
51 of the Charter.
The Turkish reaction to the Security Council decision
regarding Korea was to send a combat force of 4,500 men to
join the United Nations forces. The decision to resist
aggression v/as hailed as the first concrete application of
the collective security principle.
Participation in the United Nations
In general, Turkey did not pursue an active role in
the varying bodies of the United Nations . Although both a
Middle Eastern state and a partner of the VJest, it was
infrequently elected to represent either region. The Middle
East seat was "monopolized" by the Arab states, and Turkey
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could be no match for the more advanced and powerful V7estern
states
.
As far as the voting records are concerned, Professor
Gonlubol's study concludes that "On the questions involving
'East-West' conflict where there was considerable solidarity
of the Western nations, (disarmament, regulation of armaments,
Korea, Greece, admission of new meml^ers)
,
Turkey supported
the V7est. It has never voted v;ith the Soviet bloc in any
important issue. "^^ He also shows that on issues relating
to colonialism, Turkey had aligned itself v/ith the colonial,
advanced V7est rather than v/ith the anticolonial
, under-
developed Asian, Arab, and African states. A few examples
are its rejection of including the problem of Algiers on
the agenda, its vote against the inclusion in the proposed
human rights convenant of the phrase declaring the right of
all peoples to self-determination, and its abstention on
the questions of French North African protectorates, the
treatment of persons of Indian origin, and race conflict
in tJie Union of South Africa. Since Turkey was not a colonial
power, and had in fact won its independence from the hands
of the V7eGt, the consistent preference it gave the West can
be explained in terms of Turkey's connection to NATO. After
joining this organization, Turkey has somehov; felt the
necessity to support the viev;s of the other members in each
29Gonlubol, Participation in the United Nations, p. 160.
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foreign policy problem they came to face. This careful
avoidance of casting votes in non-Western directions was
later realized to be the prime cultivator of the isolation
enveloping Turkey in the diplomatic v/orld.
PART II. FOREIGN POLICY 7vND
THE milTED NATIONS
1960-1970
CHAPTER III
SUGGESTIONS OF CHA.NGE 1960-1963
Reaffirmation of the Ties with the West
Despite the reputation Turkey enjoyed as a staunch
ally of the VJest, the Revolution of May 27, 1960 was viewed
with alarm by the United States. The erroneous reading of
the movement as a military putsch rather than a political
rebellion was reinforced by the misguided reports received
from the American Embassy in Ankara which failed to grasp
the meaning of the socio-political dynamics of the Turkish
society. The next day, the State Department admitted to
being taken by surprise at the turn of events.
The leaders of the revolution moved quickly to dispel
unnecessary anxiety about the international position of
Turkey. In a radio message broadcast to the nation and the
world, they said, in part:
. .
\le are addressing ourselves to our allies,
friends, neighbors, and the entire v;orld: Our
aim is to remain completely loyal to the United
Nations Charter and to the principles of human
rights; the principle of peace at home and in the
world set by the great Ataturk is our flag.
We are loyal to all our alliances and
undertakings. We believe in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, and the Central Treaty Organi-
zation, and we are faithful to them.
^^New York Times, 28 May 1960.
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±n the wor!I!"3i
'^^^^ ^^^^
-It was clear that the military leaders were not plan-
:nlng to introduce substantial changes in Turkey's foreign
policies. There were indications, however, that some shifts
pf (emphasis v/ere to be expected. In terms of the ties with
•the VJestern states, the National Unity Committee of the
revolutionary leadership attached greater importance to
-the concept of equality within bilateral relationships than
the previous regime had. In a press conference in September
1960, the head of state referred to the Status of Forces
Agreement signed betv/een the United States and Turkey in
1954.. V7ithout being specific. President Gursel indicated
an intention to achieve a procedural change in the applica-
tion of the Agreement. In 1961 a report in the New York Times
revealed that the Turkish envoy, Mr. Selim Sarper , while
attending the September 1960 General Assembly meeting of
the United Nations a year earlier had asked the United
States for an increased Turkish role in deciding the duty
status of an American soldier committing a crime in Turkey.
According to the 1954 Agreement, an offender was not
accountable to Turkish jurisdiction if his command decided
he was on duty, and cleared him by issuing a duty certificate.
3
1
Esmer et al., Qlaylarla Pis Politika , p. 345.
"^^New York Tines, 4 June 1961.
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sm
^er the years this privilege of defining the duty status
ana determining it had, in the eyes of the public, been
-Repeatedly abused. The State Department probably did not
pay much serious attention to the subject initially, but
-found its hand forced in face of the bitter anti-Americani
'which developed in the aftermath of the Cyprus crisis,
-^'or It was not until 19 6 8 that a compromise was reached
Vithin the framev/ork of a new Duty Status Agreement.
"^The programs of the first and the second coalition
'"governments of 1961 and 1962 reaffirmed Turkish commitments
^tb political, economic, and military cooperation with the
West on the basis of the principles of equality and indepen-
33
^ence. Economically, Turkey received credits from the
teited States and Germany for its first Five-year Development
Plan. In 1962, aid v;as institutionalized when the Organiza-
%-ibn for Economic Cooperation and Development created a
Rjbhsortium to assist Turkish development. A year later, the
Common Market and Turkey signed an Agreement of Association
"which foresaw gradual but full Turkish membership in that
Organization. In return, Turkey continued its military
•support of NATO. The Sixth Fleet paid regular visits to
'^Turkish harbors, but more importantly, Turkey became an
^'ardent supporter of the idea to create a new multilateral
•nuclear force within NATO. Politically, Turkey and its allies
'•^Ismail Arar, Ilukumet Programlari 1920-1965 [Government
Programs 1920-1965] (Istanbul: Burcak Yaymevi, 1968),
p. 312, p. 340.
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faaintained high-level and frequent contacts, and in 1963
Turkey acceded to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
However, the most striking demonstration of Turkish solidarity
^.ith the West occurred during the Cuban missile crisis of
October 1962.
The NATO allies of the United States were informed
about the Soviet armament deliveries to Cuba in Septem].er
1962, and were urged to stop their commercial shipping to
Puba. The Turkish government then intercepted ten ships
plying betv/een Soviet harbors and Cuba, "requesting" them
to divert their destination. VThile the promptness of this
<^poperation with the United States was praised in the Con-
gj^ess, it was learned that Great Britain, reported to have
the largest share of Cuban shipments among NATO members,
i;e^jected, along with Norway, any interference with its
s|iipping. "^^
A month later, the American discovery of the presence
o^.- Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba was followed by the
arrival of two letters from Khrushchev. The first letter
offered to withdraw the missiles in Cuba if the United
States agreed to life the quarantine , and pledged not to
invade the island. The second letter, hov/ever, introduced
a new element into the bargain. The Soviet Union would with-
draw the Cuban missiles and pledge not to invade Turkey
^^New York Times, 28 September 1962.
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provided that the United States withdraw its missiles in
Turkey and pledge not to invade Cuba.^^
Suddenly, the fifteen Jupiter missiles that had been
placed near Izmir with the warm approval of Turkey in 1957,
the year of the successful launch of a satellite into
earth's orbit by the Soviets, x^ere drawn into the focus
of a superpower conflict. Only two other NATO allies,
Great Britain and Italy, had accepted to host these nuclear-
tipped missiles on their land, and neither was a neighbor
to the Soviets. VThile capable of reaching !!oscow and the
industrial Urals, these fifteen missiles constituted less
than three per cent of the first strike capability of the
United States.-^ Furthermore, due to their extreme vulner-
ability they had no potential for a second strike. Finally,
in view of the fast developing American military technology,
the missiles were considered obsolete long before they
became operational. President Kennedy had in fact ordered
their removal in early 1961, but as the Turks balked,
the matter was dropped at tliat point. -^"^ Although the crisis
gave the Soviets a good opportunity to draw a parallel between
the missiles in Cuba and Turkey, the latter did not prove to
be the central issue; in any case, they were removed by 1963.
35Allison, Essence of Decision
, pp. 221-224.
36ibid., p. 44.
37ibid.
, pp. 141-142.
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Nevertheless, the initial Turkish acceptance to host
them not only had significant implications but also was
quite detrimental to national security. First, since the
missiles had no retaliatory potential, they had to be
utilized before being hit. This, in fact, was in contradic-
tion V7ith Turkey's official view of NATO as a strictly
defensive organization. Second, far from being a deterrent,
their first-strike-only capability actually represented an
open invitation to the Soviets to precipitate an attack in
order to eliminate them. Since in accepting such an option
the costs to be accrued would be higher than the advantages,
the Turkish General Staff must have acted on a series of
assumptions resembling the following: First, more arms meant
more strength, and hence, increased security via-a~vis
the Soviets; second, the missiles would be used in a confron-
tation between the Soviet Union and Turkey only; third, the
United States v/ould step in to help its ally in such a case;
fourth, knowing this, the Soviets would avoid an attack on
Turkey. The significance of the Cuban crisis for Turkey is
that it exposed the primitiveness of the first assumption,
and the naivete of the second. Tv;o years later, the Cyprus
crisis shattered the legitimacy of the third.
If the military command learned that possession of
arms and weapons did not alv;ays bring security, but could
jeopardize it very suddenly on account of an issue not even
concerning Turkey, the political leaders realized that v/hile
the nation's fate was intertwined with those of its NATO
allies, its security interests were not necessarily so.
For the first time, the press and the elite engaged in
a heated critique of the extensive American role within
Turkish foreign policy. Especially the left, newly emerging
within the freedom of expression guaranteed by the 1961
Constitution, elaborated on these previously unfamiliar
themes
.
Limited Improvement in Relations with the Soviet Union
The period beginning with the May 1960 revolution
was not marked by drastic changes in foreign policy. Nonethe-
less, Turkish leaders showed an-. increased willingness to
move toward a policy of limited accommodation with the Soviet
Union
.
As mentioned before, the de-Stalinization and nevr
forcing policy initiated by Khrushchev after 1953 had included
a peace offensive directed to Turkey. Although traditional
suspicions and Western disapproval had not allov/ed Turkey
to be enticed by promises of peaceful coexistence, by the end
of the decade the Menderes government was prepared to adopt
a more flexible attitude. By this time, the Western states
had shown an interest in cooperation v/ith the Soviet Union;
in fact, a summit meeting betv/een the United States, the
Soviet Union, Great Britain and France had been set for xMay
1960 in Paris. Encouraged by this nevr thav/, and also hoping
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to revive the bankrupt economy by securing long-promised
Soviet aid, Menderes had asked the Foreign Ministry to
initiate the contacts. in April 1960, the two governments
officially announced their decision for an exchange of
visits by their prime ministers. Menderes 's visit had been
scheduled for July. As it turned out, the dramatic events
of that May 1960, namely, the shooting down of an American
reconnaissance plane over Soviet territory, and the army
instigated revolution in Turkey, prevented the Paris summit
and tl-ie Menderes trip, respectively.
In any case, progress toward normalized relations contin
ued. Turkey now felt ready to accept as a basis of agreement
the 1956 Soviet suggestion that her ties with the Western
alliance ought not to obstruct the improvement of relations
betv/een the two neighbors. To the Soviets, the termination
of the Menderes era with its excessive closeness to the
United States presented an opportunity to sound out the ten-
dencies within the nev; leadership of soldiers. Khrushchev's
letter of June 28, 1960 to General Gursel in part read:
"
. . .
it is our deep conviction that the most
sincere relations betv/een our two neighbor
countries would develop if Turkey emisarked upon
the road to neutrality. This would only benefit
the country. Turkey would receive an opportunity
to use her resources, not for \-jar preparations,
on which huge funds have so far been squandered,
but for raising the level of the country's national
economy and the wellbeing of its people. Military
expenditures, Mr. Prime Minister, are a bottomless
pit and not every country can endure the burden
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of them and develop its economy at the same time.
• • • •
.
. .
This, of course, is not a condition forbeginning the improvement of our relations.
. Nor
are we striving to worsen Turkey's relations withAmerica or other Western powers.
.
. . .
Your desire that Turkey, in spite of thebinding nature of the existing commitments and
alliances, should pursue an independent policy,
meets V7ith the understanding of the Soviet
government
.
. . . .
The main thing is not to search for ques-
tions on which we disagree. On the contrary,
we must search for points on which our views'
coincide so as to advance along the road to
rapprochement . "38
In his reply, General Gursel noted that Turkey's
alliance commitments allowed her "enough leev/ay" for
improving relations v/ith the Soviet Union. However, he
added
:
"I do not think that the pursuance of a neutral
policy can free the government from military
expenditures. If that were so, then such
countries as Sv;eden, Switzerland or India for
that matter v/ould have no military budgets.
. ... In reality, liquidation, or at least
reduction of military expenditures can be
made possible, not be neutrality, but by the
establishment of a system of universal disarma-
ment with an effective control mechanism, which
would ensure the security of all the countries
of the world, vmether large or small, against
any aggression on the part of any state.
Until the creation of such a system of interna-
tional disarm.ament , . ... no state can renounce
^Documents on International Affairs 1960 , quoted
in Ferenc Vali, TlTe~Turkish Straits and NATO , Hoover
Institution StudFes 32 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press,
1972)
, pp. 302-305.
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the means of ensuring its security. Turk^vprompted by this lawful concern, ^^malns 'l^yalto Its policy of nerpl^ership in collective
security systems. "39
Despite mutual recognition of a basis for cooperation,
the next two years did not produce much progress. The
Soviets sent a note of warning when the Jupiter missiles
were being installed in 1961, and called again on both the
Turkish and Greek governments in 1962 to ban atomic weapons
and rockets from the Balkans and the Adriatic."^" They
sharply denounced the Turkish decision to halt shipping to
Cuba in the v/ake of the October 1962 crisis. And,
certainly, the proposal of Khrushchev to barter the withdrawal
of their missiles in Cuba with the withdrawal of American
missiles in Turkey must have brought home to Turks much more
effectively than any Soviet note the acute irritation of
Moscov/ to be ringed by the offensive weapons of its rival
along its borders.
During the same period there were constant rumors
about Soviet offers of credit. The Turkish government,
although very eager to obtain foreign credits in order to
get its first Five-year Devalopm.ent Plan off the ground,
did not conclude a credit agreement with the Soviet Union
at this time. However, the trade capacity reached a new
•^^ Ibid
.
, p. 306,
^^New York Times, 7 June 1962.
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level, and a minor railroad agreement went into effect in
1961 linking the two sides of the Caucasian border.
The four coalition governments formed in 19fil, 1962,
1963 and 1965 pledged to develop the relations with the
northern neighbor based on mutual respect and good neigh-
borliness, and in accordance with the existing international
commitments. ^2 in line with this new policy of better
relations, and upon an invitation of the Soviet side, a
parliamentary delegation, headed by Mr. Suat Urguplu, the
Speaker of the Senate, arrived in Moscow for an official
goodwill visit. According to the reports in the press,
Khrushchev, Brezhnev and the other leaders repeated to the
delegation at every opportunity that since the Soviet Union
had no demands on. Turkey, it was possible to revive the
friendship that existed betv/een the tv;o countries during the
Ataturk-Lenin era, and that not only could the commercial
41
The Institute of International Relations, University
of Ankara, The Turkish Yea rl-.ook of International Relations
1961 (Ankara: Ajans Turk Press, 1963), p. 242.
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The new electoral system of proportional represen-
tation designed to prevent any party from gaining an over-
whelming parliamentary majority coupled v;ith the increase
in the number of political parties competing for the votes,
and the controversy over the issue of amnesty for the deposed
rienderes regime resulted in a series of unstable coalition
cabinets. The 1961 coalition was between the Republican and
the Justice Parties; in 1962, the Republican party united
with tv;o smaller centrist parties; the third coalition v;as an
alignment of the Republicans and the Independents while the
1965 coalition saw a short-lived cooperation betv/een the Justice
Party and the tv;o small parties. However, a degree of contin-
uity was provided by the fact that three of the four coalition?
V7ere headed by prime minister Inonu.
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relations be increased but that the Soviet Union v;as
capable of extending economic aid under much better condi-
tions than v;as offered by the VJest.^^ After one of these
talks, Mr, Urguplu declared: "I told [Khrushchev] that it
is not possible to expect an immediate and important progress
in the Soviet-Turkish relations . "^^
It will be useful for future reference to note here
the developments in the early sixties concerning the
establishment of a multilateral nuclear submarine force
v^ithin NATO, Turkey had shov/n receptiveness to the
^erican initiative from the start, and evidently regarded
it as an appropriate substitute for the Jupiter missiles,
in April 1963 a special representative of President Kennedy,
Mr.. Livingstone Marchand, arrived in Ankara to consult
with the Turkish officials on this project. His visit was
followed by a Soviet note in May, the contents of v/hich were
revealed indirectly within the Turkish reply dated early
July, Soon after, the reply to the Soviets was made public
by- the Information Office of the Foreign Ministery. It
rejected the Soviet proposal that the Mediterranean Sea be
declared a nuclear and missile-free area, and at the same time,
repeated the Turkish desire for a complete and general dis-
armament under effective control, The subject might have
^"^Esmer et al,, Olaylarla Pis Politika , p, 454,
^"^The Institute of International Relations, University
of Ankara, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations,
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been discussed during the visit of the parliamentary dele-
gation in June. Interestingly, after the eruption of the
Cyprus crisis, the Turks found it necessary to reconsider
their previous enthusiasm for the nuclear submarine force,
and in fact, informed the United States of ending their
cooperation from the project.
During the four year period from 1960 to the end of
1963, Turkey's relations with the Soviet-guided states of
Europe did not register any significant developments.
Cominercial agreements v/ith Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bul-
garia, among others, were signed on a regular basis. Al-
though Turkey has alv;ays been interested in the Balkan
states of Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia due to their
geographical proximity to both the Soviet Union and the
European Turkey, the area did not receive top-priority
attention i-zithin Turkish diplomacy. Relations v/ith Yugo-
slavia and Romania have been friendly, Bulgaria, on the
other hand, v/as regarded as a staunch ally of Iloscow. A
sprinkling of Turks live in all throe countries, a legacy
of the Ottoman rule of previous centuries. The treatment
of the Turkish minorities has become a sensitive issue in
the case of Bulgaria. VThereas the Balkan region did not
receive much attention, except for friendly relations with
1963 (Ankara: Tmkara University Press, 1965), p. 320.
"^^Ibid.
,
p. 322.
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Yugoslavia, in the foreign policy sections of the four
government programs covering this period, both the 1962
and 1963 programs specifically refer to the uncooperative
attitude of the Bulgarian government and the anti-Turk
propaganda of their press and the leaders. At one point,
Ankara felt it necessary to caution Bulgaria that it would
break ties unless the discriminatory treatment of the esti-
mated 900,000 Turks improved.^' In 1966, there was a notice-
able relaxation of tension with Bulgaria, and in general,
an improvement in Turkey's ties with pro-Soviet countries
of Europe, all accompanying the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement
ment follov/ing the Cyprus crisis.
The Third World Policy and the United Nations
Just as Turkey came to entertain, in the early 19 60 's, •
its first doubts about the soundness of having very close
ties with the United States, and was prompted to turn a
more receptive, albeit cautious ear to the Soviets, the
official attitude toward long-time neutrals
,
nev/ly indepen-
dent non-bloc countries, and those striving for independence
underwent a modest change. During the 19 61 budget discussions
in the National Assembly, the foreign minister Selim Sarper
elaborated first on the situation of the developing countries.
^^Arar, Ilukumet Programlari
, p. 372, p. 401.
^^^New York Times, 9 September 1962.
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« departure from the customary procedures of official
jyronouncements. Indicating the closeness felt by his coun-
t-ry toward those struggling for independence and freedom,
m., Sarper denounced the fact that they had become the
J>ri.zes in a political and military competition sustained
by the division of the world into two "fronts." He called
for the support of those efforts exerted by the United
:Nations in order to alleviate the situation, and expressed
the hope that the developing countries will be supplied
'the economic and technical aid they ask for exclusively
out of their free will/^
Another enlightened note was sounded in the 1961
election manifesto of the Republican Party which failed to
achieve a majority in the parliament, but led the three coali-
tion governments of the next three years. The manifesto
explained that while Turkey could not lead a neutralist
policy due to its historical development and geographical
considerations, it would nevertheless follow a policy of
friendship v/ith those countries \7hich, based on similar
reasoning, are of the opinion that they can adopt neutrality . ^ ^
This attitude was markedly different from that of the Menderes
era of the 1950' s v/hen the Turks regarded the neutralist
countries with a touch of contempt as demonstrated during
^^Esmer et al., Olaylarla Pis Politika , p. 346.
''^Ibid., p. 349.
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the 1955 Bandung Conference.
There were several attempts at increased cooperation
with developing and far-away countries. Good will missions
were sent to Africa, representation in Mali was upgraded to
the ambassadorial level, Ethiopian and Japanese ships called
on Turkish ports, and a Mexican parliamentary Relegation was
received in /oikara. Earlier, the revolutionary military
leadership of the National Unity Committee had declared its
solidarity for the Algerian nationalists fighting the
French a.rmy. A foreign nev;spaper revealed the nev/s that
General Gursel had offered his services as a mediator
betv/een France and the Algerians, but that the suggestion
had been rejected inferentially by a spokesman of the French
Foreign Ministry. Ankara shov/ad its sympathy for the
Algerian cause by aiding the refugees in M.orocco. Premier
Inonu warmly hailed deGaulle for his decision to grant
Algeria independence after a seven-year war.
Successive governments emphasized the special closeness
between Turkey and the ?.rab states. The Libyan ambassador
applauded the decision of the revolutionary government to
improve relations \/ith the Arabs, and noted the possibilities
for cooperation in the fields of econom.ic development and
social welfare.^-^ Relations v/ith the Middle Eastern Arabs,
^^New York Tim.es , 18 SeptemJi^er 1960.
^^Ankara University, Turkish Yearbook 1961, p. 231.
62
however, oscillated. Turkey recognized Syria when she with-
drew from the United Arab Republic. Regarding this as a
rebuke, Egypt broke diplomatic relations with Turkey which,
however, were restored tv7o years later. V7ith Iraq, there
was a short-lived flareup over the Kurdish problem. In
chase of the revolting Kurds, Iraqi planes had bombed
Turkish posts at the frontier several times. Turkey
retaliated by downing an airplane, and v;as charged by Iraq
of allov/ing outlaws and criminals to use its territory as
a base for creating trouble in Northern Iraq. Ever sensi-
tive to this problem, the Soviet Union warned Turkey, Iran
and Syria that their "interference" would constitute a
definite danger to the peace in the area. The matter came
to a close as Turkey promptly offered to submit the dispute
to an international commission for arbitration, and premier
Inonu, rejecting any Turkish wish to interfere in Iraq,
emphasized his country's good V'/ill tov/ard the Arab and
Soviet neighbors.^*"
The foreign policy of Ankara between 1960-1963 with
its unchanged basis accompanied by a few minor shifts v;as
faithfully mirrored in the United Nations. The changes
were observed in the attitude towards the North African
Moslems v;ho v;ere trying to assert their independence at home
Turkey voted at the United Nations to support the Algerians,
^^New York Times, 18 July 196 3.
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gp^rtime subjects of the Ottoman Empire, against the French,
f ;png-time ally. Similarly, on the question of the French
oqcupation of Bizerte, Turkey sided with Tunisia along with
mny uncommitted nations. In fact, the Turkish delegate,
Mr. Turgut Menemencioglu expressing his concern in the
^,9qurity Council, offered a draft resolution calling for
a^n immediate cease-fire and the opening of early negotiations
£or peace.
Turkish sympathies for the newly emerging North
African states did not stretch to include, for example,
Qoa. and the other Portuguese colonial enclaves in the Indian
s^ubcontinent. V^en India militarily invaded these enclaves,
Tv^key joined the ranks of the United States, Great Britain,
^pA/^^^^^^ the. Security Council and co-sponsored a reso-
lution for an immediate cease-fire and withdrav;al of Indian
troops. Such active participation in condemning threats to
t^^ overseas possessions of colonial states was in fact a
cpntinuation of the imprudent Turkish policy of extending
uriqritical support to its NATO allies in their problems of
foreign policy.
The general tendency to side with the West was also
exhibited in such non-urgent questions as the membership of
Communist Chinese, and the structural change in the executive
branch of the United Nations. Turkey opposed both the
Chinese membership, and the Soviet suggestion of replacing
the Secretary General v/ith a three-man directorate serviced
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by a staff shaped according to the three major political
groupings of world states. However, when acting as the
president of the Security Council on the basis of the ro-
tating nonpermenant membership. The Turkish representative
worked out a compromise on the problem of the Soviet-backed
membership of Outer Mongolia, and the American-supported
membership of Mauritania. The compromise arrangement was
accepted by all sides as not violating the principle against
pairing the admission of controversial candidates, and
both countries v/ere admitted by the General Assembly.
It can be said that the Turkish participation in
the fifteenth to the eighteenth sessions betv/een 19 60 and
1963 of the General Assem})ly did not posit any outstanding
marks, but v;as largely confined to the customary speeches,
committee work, and press conferences. The dramatic change
in the significance of this international forum to Turkish
interests was marked in December 19 63 with the sudden flare-
up of communal warfare betv/een the Cypriot Greeks and
Turks, and the skillful presentation of the ethnic conflict
by the Cypriot government to the United Nations.
CHAPTER IV
THE CYPRUS CRISIS
Background 1571-1960
The island of Cyprus lies in the eastern Mediterranean
forty miles from the southern coast of Turkey, and 500 miles
from Greece. Eighty percent of the population are Greek
Orthodox, and 20 percent are Turkish-speaking Moslems.
Due to its strategic position the island during its
history from 300 B.C. until 1960 had come under the rule
of the Ptolem.ies, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Lusignans,
the Venetians, the Turks, and the British.' The Ottomans
took it over from the Venetians in 1571, and were to rule
over it for the next three centuries. They restored the
supremacy of the Orthodox archbishop, and abolished the
system of serfdom among the peasants. In time, the arch-
bishop and the Greek notables enhanced their influence, and
enjoyed direct access to the Sultan,
In 1878, when the Empire v/as fast v/eakening and had
just lost territory to the Russians, the Ottomans signed a
Convention with the British consenting to their occupation
and administration of the island of Cyprus in return for
^•^Robert Stephens, Cyprus: A Place of Arms (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 22.
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:an
British agreenient to defend the territories of the Sult^
against Russian encroachments. An annex stipulated the ter-
mination of the 1878 Convention if Russia restored to the
Ottomans its recent conquests. And thus while juridically
Cyprus remained a part of the Ottoman Empire, in reality
it offered England control over the island and the sea route
through the Suez Canal to India.
Throughout the colonial phase of its history, the
Cypriots of Greek origin formulated their call for Enosis—
uniting the island v/ith mainland Greece. Predictably, each
such call would draw a protest from the Cypriots of Turkish
origin who in turn advocated the return of Turkish sovereignty
over the island, When Britain introduced the first colonial
constitution in 1882, the Turkish Cypriots opposed self-
government which v;ould not be based on a complete equality
of the tv;o comjnunities on the grounds that this v/ould put
them at the mercy of the Greek majority, whose aim of Enosis
was contrary to their own interests. Britain, on its part,
viewed Enosis as incompatible with its rule over the island.
For this reason, she found it expedient to exploit the bi-
communal differences in Cyprus. For example, bi-communally
administered education not only perpetuated segregation,
but also reinforced the historical ties each community shared
with its mother country.
The first World War found England and the Ottoman
Empire confronting each other. England formally annexed
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.Cyprus in 1914; this move was recognized by the new national-
ist government of Turkey in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. In-
terestingly, Britain had offered the island to the Greek
government during the first year of the War in exchange
for Greek participation on the Allied side, but the Greeks
had rejected the offer preferring not to expose the newly
acquired Balkan territory to further risks in a new war.
Between the two V7orld V7ars
, Britain emerged as the
dominant po\;er in the Middle East. Having now several
footholds in the area the strategic importance of Cyprus
was no longer very significant. The bi-communal nature of
the island continued along with an increased momentum for
Panhellenism. This was to be reinforced by the principle
of self-determination which was v/idely accepted by the
international community at the end of the second World War.
Indeed, the two concepts of anti-colonialism and self-
<3etermination were sanctioned by the Charter of the United
Nations. However, by then the British power had started
its decline, and consequently, the importance of maintaining
control over Cyprus v/as once again on the rise.
During the 1950 's the confrontation between the Cypriot
Greeks and the British entered a new phase marked by revolts
and open violence. The Enosis movement was conducted by the
ethnarch of the island, Archbishop Makarios III, and George
Grivas , a Cypriot officer in the Greek army who had come
back to Cyprus to initiate terrorist activity against the
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British, For that purpose, the two men formed an under-
,ground guerilla organization known as the EOKA (National
Organization of Cypriot Fighters)
.
The political framework of the fighting on the island
was widened only when Greece officially adopted the cause
Pf the Cypriot Greeks. So far Turkey had regarded the
developments as a domestic matter between the government
of the island and its Greek community. fJhe felt obliged to
take an active part in the question when Greece submitted it
to the United Nations in 1954 as a colonial problem
involving the principle of self-determination.^"^ Turkey
advanced the legalistic argument of retrocession, indicating
^hat in the event of a cliange in the status-quo as determined
by the Turkish recognition of British sovereignty over
Cyprus in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, she would have grounds
for asking that the island be returned to her. The General
Assembly, duo to intense British pressures against having
the issue discussed in that forum, simply recommended that
it be negotiated by the parties directly involved.
The diplomatic impasse prompted the EOKA to initiate
a v;ave of guerilla attacks directed at tlie British admini-
stration. In 1955, Britain invited Greece and Turkey to
London to discuss the situation. Makarios protested the
absence of representation for the Cypriot Greeks. Neither
54
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was Greece pleased by the inclusion of Turkey. She
pressed for self-determination for Cyprus which was the
demand for Enosis presented in a form more palatable to
international opinion. Britain refused the application of
the principle of self-determination to Cyprus, knowing
also the total inacceptability of Enosis for the Turks.
In return, Greece rejected the proposal of London for a
limited self-government supervised by Britain, Greece, and
Turkey. The London conference was suspended in September
1955.
This time, the resumption of hostilities on the island
spread along intercommunal lines. Turkey, now determined
to take a stronger stand, brought forth the argument that
she would not oppose the principle of self-determination for
the island provided that it be applied to the Greek and
Turkish communities separately. As one study indicated,
"... the Turkish argument rested on Article 73 of the
United IJations Charter, according to which the development
of self-government was to be encouraged in accordance v/ith
the 'particular circumstances of each territory and its
peoples. The 'particular circumstance' of the peoples v/as,
in this case, the existence of tv;o distinct communities,
while the 'particular circumstance' of the territory was
the island's geographical proximity to Anatolia. According
to Article 73, the will of the Turkish coirjnunity of Cyprus
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and the security of Turkey had to be taken into considera-
55tion." Since the application of this reasoning would
result in each comiTiunity • s choosing to unite with its respec-
tive mainland, the proposal came to be known as Taksim
(the Turkish word for partition)
.
While the fighting continued a combination of factors
transformed the conflict to a new phase. Concerned that
Makarios, Greece, and Britain may reach a settlement on the
side, Turkey changed its stance from retrocession to parti-
tion. For Makarios, however, this v/as certainly worse than
British rule. On the other hand, not only did Britain show
an interest in the idea of Taksim
, but also Makarios could
not expect Greece to antagonize a much stronger Turkey
beyond a certain limit. Furthermore, not much progress was
achieved in the United Nations, In February 1957, the
Political Committee of the General Assembly had expressed the
hope for a resumption of negotiations. Ten months later, a
similar resolution added the hope for the application of the
principle of self-determination. The resolution seemed to
favor the Greeks although it failed to get the two-thirds
majority necessary for a recommendation. By December 1958
however, Greeks saw the defeat of their resolutions in the
General Assembly. Finally, the British on their part, had
55
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coiue to the view that sovereignty over a few bases rather
than the whole island would be sufficient for their strate-
gic needs.
Assessing the factors above and realizing that Enosis
aid not need to be achieved promptly and in one step, Makar
indicated that an independent Cyprus would be an acceptable
solution to the crisis. This led, in 1959, to an immediate
round of negotiations in Zurich, between the Greek and
Turkish prime ministers, Karamanlis and nenderes. The dis-
cussions were then moved to London where the prime ministers
were joined by their foreign ministers, the leaders of the
'Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus, and the representa-
tives of Britain. The initialed agreements formed the basis
<ot three multilateral treaties, and a constitution which was
^drafted within a year, making Cyprus an independent Republic
-on August 1960.
Before explaining the essence and the basic tenents
'of these documents, it is necessary to realize that Cyprus
is basically a regional problem betv/een Turkey and Greece.
~A brief look at the historical entanglement of these two
peoples v;ill help to underline this dispute as one among
many v/ithin a relationship of traditional adversity v;hose
-roots go back five centuries. The Byzantine Empire had
:reached the fifteenth century besieged by internal disorder
as a result of the bitter feud with the Latins. Its demise
came in 145 3 v;hen the Ottoman Turks conquered Constantinople.
lOS
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'!Phe Orthodox Christian religion gave way to Islam, although
<^1 the non-!Ioslem subjects of the Ottoman Empire continued
±o pursue their livelihood under the tolerant institution of
inillet—a system which allowed the non-Islamic religious
(Communities to administer their own cultural, religious, and
private legal affairs. One of the early beneficiaries of
this system v/as the Greek millet whose cultural heritage
was intact v/hen nationalism began to spread in the nine-
±eenth century. The Greeks then v/ere inspired to resurrect
tthe former Byzantine Empire, aiming to bring together all
-living Greeks, a vision knov;n as the Megali Idea. The
xevolt led to the establishment in 1832 of an independent
^reek state vrhich increased its territory at the expense of
±he Ottoman Empire over the next century. The high point
Df the vision came during the Turkish war of independence
!(19;19~1922) when the Turkish nationalist government of
^aturk was fighting the British, the French, the Italians,
<and their collaborator, the Sultan. The Greeks were lured
Irnto the war by the British offer of "important concessions
on the coasts of Asia Minor." Tempted by the possibility of
fulfilling the Panhellenic ideal, and even reaquiring Istan-
bul, the Greeks embarked upon a massive invasion of Western
Anatolia, In the course of the ensuing v/ar, the Allies quick-
ly established truces on several fronts, whereas the Greek
army penetrated inland. The result was the decimation of half
of its forces, with the remaining half driven back to the
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Aegean. Thus the birth of the new Turkish state marked the
^nd of the irredentist Hegali Idea
.
The independence and the territorial integrity of the
Turkish Republic was internationally acknowledged by the
1923 Treaty of Lausanne which also settled the outstanding
problems between Turkey and Greece. The two countries
initiated a mass exchange of populations deemed necessary
after "the murderous events of the Greek invasion and tlie
subsequent Turkish liberation of Anatolia" when the safety
pf the coexisting Turks and Greeks seemed endangered. How-
ever, Athens and Ankara agreed not to uproot the Turkish
enthnic minorities in VJestern Thrace and on the islands,
and the Greeks in Istanbul. Greece kept the Aegean islands
(except for tv;o near the Dardanelles' entrance), but agreed
not to militarize four of them lying especially close to the
Turkish coast. The Dodecanese Islands remained in the hands
of Italy, while Turkey recognized British sovereignty over
Cyprus
.
Between 1930 and 1933, and under the able leaderships
pf Venizelos and Ataturk, Greece and Turkey normalized their
relationship signing two treaties and a friendship pact.
They collaborated further by foming with Yugoslavia the
Balkan Entente in 1934.
During the second World War, Turkey remained neutral
while Greece was overrun by Germany. The relation v/as also
strained when Ankara adopted and quickly rescinded a tax
^''vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus, p. 221.
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measure discriminatory against the minorities. At the same
time, hov/ever, Turkey sent humanitarian help to Greece and
allowed the use of her territory in the support of Greek
guerillas. A bitter pill to swallow for Ankara after the
war was the cession by Italy to Greece of the Dodecanese
Islands including the island of Rhodes. This certainly
upset the balance in the Aegean, but in face of the dis-
pleasure caused by her wartime neutrality in the eyes of
the Allies, coupled by the newly emerging Soviet threats,
Turkey could not launch a protest at a diplomatically weak
moment.
After 1945, ties of friendship flourished once again.
Both countries were covered by the Truman Doctrine, both
joined NATO about the same time and cooperated closely
within it, and both were recipients of considerable 2\merican
aid. Together with Yugoslavia, they again established a
short-lived Balkan Defense Pact (see p.29 ) Unfortunately,
the tv70 states headed for a confrontation over Cyprus v/hen
Greece formally announced her support for the Enosis demands
of the Cypriot Greeks and their leader, Makarios. To the
Turks, the desire to unite Cyprus with Greece v/as clearly
reminiscent of the previous Megali Idea .
For the period of the 1955-1958 EOKA struggle, the
mutual aims of Greece and the Greek Cypriot leadership were
first and foremost, to annex Cyprus with Greece; second, to
end the British hegemony; and third, to oppose the Turkish
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prpposal to Taksim (partition)
. For Turkey and the Turkish
gypriot
,
on the other hand, Enosis was to be opposed by
all i^eans. The Turks would not have objected to continued
British rule which perpetuated the bi-communal nature of the
island. And the Taksim thesis was open to modification.
The Turkish determination to prevent Enosis was and is
grounded in a number of reasons which might be grouped under
three categories: A) Strategic, B) Political, C) Historical.
h) The strategic reasoning is twofold. First, the geographic
location of Cyprus is considered crucial to Turkey's
security especially during a time of war. In the words of
the minister of foreign affairs (1955), "In case of a war,
the aefcnse force of Turkey can be externally supplied
pnly through our southern and western harbors in the Medi-
terranean. The western harbors of Turkey are unfortunately
in the sphere of influence of a probable enemy, so that Turkey
can be supplied only through its southern harbors. This
situation had clearly materialized during the second World
War. Keeping this reality in mind, the starting points of
the infrastructure netv,'ork that feeds Turkey are all located
in the southern tov/ns like Antalya, Ilersin, Yumurtalik, and
I^kenderun. Indeed, even the fuel needs of Istanbul are
served by a pipeline from the southern coast. And all these
southern harbors are under the protection of the Cyprus
island. Whoever rules that island also commands the protec-
tion of these Turkish harbors. If at the same time, he also
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possesses the Aegean islands, a de facto encirclement of
Turkey will be achieved. No country can base its total
security on any one state no matter how friendly or
allied. "^^
Second, the balance of power between Turkey and Greece
in the Aegean and the Mediterranean is at issue. As arranged
by the treaty of Lausanne, Greece kept the islands, many of
which she had nibbled away from the Ottoman Empire (Crete,
for example)
,
but agreed not to militarize those lying within
a few miles of the Western coast of Turkey. The disadvan-
tageous position of the latter considerably worsened v/hen a
set of islands, the Dodecanese (including PJiodes)
, was
ceded by Italy to Greece after the second V7orld War. Greece
can easily use these islands to close the Aegean to naviga-
tion, and thus cut off access to the Turkish straits and
Istanbul. Ankara feels it has every reason to be adamant
that the existing imbalance not be further aggravated Ijy
allov/ing Greece to acquire another strategic foothold in the
eastern Mediterranean.
B) The political reasoning follows closely the strate-
gic considerations relevant to the rejection of Enor^is
.
In estimating the political future of Greece, Turkey pursued
a conseirvative line, and assumed that the future developments
58Esmer et al., Olaylarla Pis Politika, pp. 368-369.
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iin her neighbor 's politics might be directly contrary to the
Western orientation of Turkey. After all, only a decade
^earlier Greece x/as on the verge of a Communist takeover.
;A iregime hostile to Ankara would certainly be in a position
-.to create innumerable difficulties for Turkey, considering
the strategic advantages Greece enjoys in the Aegean Sea.
:I:f Cyprus v/ere Greek territory, the political climate of
.Athens v/ould necessarily be reflected in the island; v/hereas,
-without Enosis
,
Turkey could hope to exert some influence
over Cyprus even if Greece V7ere to become a political adver-
.sary,
rC) What can be grouped as arguments based on historical
^reasoning are more varied. First, the Turks point to the
"•^jommunal nature", of the island, rooted in the millet system
(Of the Ottomans that has come dovm to the present from the
.sixteenth century. The preceding colonial phase v/as also
marked by the British recognition of the presence of two equal
.communities on Cyprus. The Turks are strongly convinced
•that neither community should exercise control over the other.
?he matter rests on a basis of two distinct communities
enjoying equal rights and privileges, and cannot, they claim,
he approached from the point of view of a majority-minority
jrela-bionship.
59Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus , p. 243.
^°A lucid discussion of this issue is to be found in
Christian Heinze, "The Cyprus Conflict: The ^'^estern Peace
System is Put to the Test." Turkish Yearbook 1963 (Vol. IV) p. 5
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Second, the Turkish government is seriously concerned
about the safety and the v/ell-being of the island-Turks in
case of Enosis
.
The memory of the Greek performance during
the occupation of western Anatolia is enough motivation for
not leaving the fate of the Cypriot Turks completely in the
hands of the Greeks.
Finally, Cyprus is regarded as a matter of national
prestige, and has touched off considerable popular interest
in Turkey. Both the political leaders and the people take
the position that what had happened to Crete— the Ottoman
acceptance to relinquish that island on arguments of self-
government, followed by its annexation to Greece--must not be
repeated with Cyprus. In Turkish eyes, the healthy Republic
of the twentieth century V7hich has replaced the deteriorating
Empire of the nineteenth could and should stand firm for its
legitimate causes.
The London-Zurich Agreements of 1960 terminated the
British rule over the island, rejected both Enosis and Taksim
as viable alternatives, and agreed on independence as a solu-
tion acceptable to each party concerned. The relations of the
new Cyprus Republic with Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey,
were arranged by three treaties, while the Constitution of the
same year regulated the legal framework within which the two
communities of Cyprus would coexist.
In the first treaty, the Treaty Concerning the Establish-
ment of the Republic of Cyprus, the three states of Great Bri-
tain, Greece, and Turkey sanctioned the independence of
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Cyprus exclusing the two base areas remaining under British
sovereignty. The parties, along with Cyprus, agreed to
"consult and cooperate in the common defense of Cyprus. "^^
In the second treaty, the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus
agreed to maintain respect for its constitution, and "not to
participate, in whole or in part, in any political and economic
union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares
prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirect-
ly, either union with any other State or partition of the Is-
6 2land." Greece, Turkey, and Britain, on their part, guaran-
teed the independence, territorial integrity and security of
Cyprus. They also agreed to prohibit any activity promoting
either Enosis or Taksim
, and in case of a breach of the Treaty
to consult and take the necessary measures to ensure the obser-
vance of the treaty. Article IV provided specifically that
"In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possibl j
each of the three guaranteeing Pov;ers reserves the right to
take actions v/ith the sole aim of re-establishing the state of
affairs created by the present Treaty." During the v;orst
days of the intercommunal crises of 1963 and 1967, Turkey in-
voiced this article as the basis for its threats of interven-
tion, although it never exercised the option.
^•^Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic
of Cyprus, Turkish Yearbook 19G3 , p. 202.
^^Ibid.
, p. 299.
^-^Ibid.
, p. 300.
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In the third treaty, Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus
formed an alliance to resist any aggressive attacks on the
latter. The Treaty of Alliance set up a military tripartite
headquarters on Cyprus to which Greece and Turkey were to
assign 950 and 650 men, respectively. The supreme politi-
cal body of the alliance would be the Committee of Ministers
consisting of the ministers of foreign affairs of Cyprus,
Greece, and Turkey. Incidentally, the tripartite headquar-
ters were to be responsible to this political committee.
The domestic political life, on the other hand, v/as
regulated by the Cypriot constitution in an intricate sys-
tem of checks and balances. The Republic adopted a presi-
dential system of government with the executive power, over
all except communal affairs, resting in the hands of a
Greek president and Turkish vice-president. The two states-
men were to be elected by their respective communities, and
to be aided by a council of ten ministers, seven of whom
would be Greek, with one of the three key positions of foreign
affairs, defense, and security going to the Turks. Con-
cerning decisions in these three areas, the president and
the vice-president would have separately or jointly the
right of veto.
The legislature, the House of Representatives, was to
have a membership of 70 percent Greeks and 30 percent Turks,
with a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president. In
matters relating to the electoral law, the municipalities.
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itaxes or duties, separate majorities were required from both
(Communal members
.
;In addition to the legislature, there were to be
separate and elected "Communal Chambers" to administer
religious, educational, cultural affairs, questions of per-
sonal status and communal activities, as well as the finan-
cing of such matters. In addition, there were to be
separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five tovms
of the island.
The courts also v;ere based on a bi-communal basis
with mixed courts ruling only over cases when parties to the
plispute belonged to different communities. The constitution
also set up a Supreme Constitutional Court to hear cases con-
gerning contested
. legislation. A neutral judge who would
not be from Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, or Britain would preside,
flanked by one Greek and one Turkish judge.
h seventy-thirty ratio between Greeks and Turks v;as to
be applied in the staffing of the civil service, the police,
and gendarmarie. Kovjever, the army would consist of GO per-
cent Greeks and 40 percent Turks,
Both Greel'is and Turkish were the official languages,
and each community could celebrate their respective national
holidays
.
Thus, duality v/as the conceptual basis of the constitu-
tion reflecting the fact that on Cyprus there are two dif -
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feront communities existing with each other. It was recog-
nized that the new state was not a nation-state, since there
was no Cypriot nation. The Turkish side relied on the
constitution to almost legislate equity into every phase of
political life, indicating a lack of trust in the intentions
Pf the Greek side. If the constitutional provisions pro-
vided a system of checks on the power of the majority,
then the multilateral treaties gave Turkey the right to
intervene in the island if the events were developing in a
direction contrary to that established by the three treaties
and the constitution. The 650 men Turkish contingent was
a further symbolic indicator of the military interest Turkey
had for Cyprus. Most importantly, as one of the three
guarantors, the legality of the Turkish claims v/ere recog-
nized to be on the same level as those of Greece and Great
Britain. The treaties gave Greece the same rights, and by
restoring the previous cooperative friendship she had enjoyed
with Turkey, strengthened her security. The Cypriot Greek
community acquired the right to administer the island \;ith
the stipulation to respect the Turkish community's rights.,
Arid finally, Britain secured tv/o base areas which met her
demands on the island.
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Highlights of the Conflict 1963 "19f^7
rThe best interests of the independent republic required
a healthy dose of good will and intentions in order to apply
the comprehensive and perhaps cuml^ersome constitution.
Inonu had recognized, as early as 1959, the distance between
legality and reality in Cyprus v^hen, as the leader of the
opposition, he criticized the London-Zurich Agreements by a
prophetic analysis of the treaties:
. . m confronting
an Enosis movement, it is not very likely that Greece v/ill
be siding with us. England is not bound by a definite commit-
ment for intervention. Even if she admits a violation of
the constitution and the need to intervene, it is up to
ber to judge whether or not to participate in a military
intervention for this purpose. If England acts this way,
the intervention will be agreed upon mutually, as stated in
the Treaty of Guarantee, but it will not be carried in
mutual cooperation. In that case, Turkey will have to move
alone against the violation of its cause. Besides, it should
npt be forgotten that at that time the violator of the Treaty,
the Republic of Cyprus, v/ill be a member of the United
Nations. The conflict is a matter of shared concern for the
World Organization and specifically for the Security Council.
In that situation, if Turkey achieves the capability to in-
tervene by exercising its option sv/iftly, she will succeed by
a legitimate fait accompli . However, it cannot he claimed
that the conditions are and v/ill always be amenable for a
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fast military intervention on our side. Even though this
Treaty seems to eliminate an extra-constitutional attempt
for Enosis, in reality it has not done so. On tlie other
hand, the thesis of Taksim has been eliminated de jure and
5^_facto.
.
,M j^egrettably, the constitutional order was
challenged at every turn, and within a matter of four years,
the turn of events dreaded by Inonu had materialized.
The specific issues of friction were the separate muni-
cipalities, the 30 percent Turlcish participation in the
civil service, the veto right of the Turkish vice-president,
and the establishment of the Cypriot army. The Greek side
claimed that the provisions regulating such matters v;ere
in applicable v;hile the Turks insisted that the constitution,
having being drafted voluntarily by the tv;o sides, had to
be implemented. In essence, the difficulties were simply
a manifestation of the entirely different orientations of the
tv7o communities toward the constitution and the status of
independence as v/ell as the partnership of the communities
that it upheld. This status v/as not the desired aim of the
Greek Cypriot leadership's 1955-1958 EOKA struggle; instead,
they had consented to it as a tactical move when they had
realized that uniting Cyprus v/ith Greece could not be achieved
immediately. For them, the constitutional order was meant to
be challenged and molded from the "two communities v;ith equal
64
Esmer et al., Olaylarla Pis Politika , p. 397.
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rights" to a "majority-minority" basis, leaving the Cypriot
Greeks unhindered in the pursuit of Enosis
. The Turkish
Cypriot leadership felt handicapped from the beginning
realizing that independence was to be "used for the same end
which it purported to have prohibited as a sine qua non
of peaceful cooperation betv/een the two communities."^^
Toward the end of 1963, Markarios submitted to the
Turkish vice-president and the guarantor states a memorandum
listing thirteen proposals for amending the constitution.
The veto pov/er of the vice-president, and the separate
majorities required in the legislature for adopting laws and
amendments in the key areas of taxes, municipalities, and
the electoral laws v/ere to be abolished. The municipalities,
the courts, and the army v/ere to be reorganized on a unitary
basis. The civil servants v/ere to be recruited on a 80-20
percent ratio. Clearly, the thirteen amendments represented
an open bid to abrogate the rights of the Turkish community.
The leaders of both Turkey and the Cypriot Turks promptly
and strongly rejected them.
Fighting started within days leading swiftly into a
savage massacre of Turks on Christmas of 1963. This pattern
^^Rauf Denktas, "The Cyprus Problem," Foreign Policy "
(March 1971)
,
p. 96.
^^An emotional but illviminating first-hand account of
the violence on the island is supplied by Scott nibbons, a
British journalist living in Cyprus in Peace VJithout Honor
(Ankara: ADA Publishing House, 1969).
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was continued over the next two years. The intentions of
Makarios v/ere clarified when he announced in January 1964,
without prior consultations and unilaterally, the abrogation
of the London-Zurich Treaties. The concerned governments
came together once again in London, but the diametrically
opposed views of the Turkish and Greek sides failed to pro-
duce an understanding. A second major Greek offensive on
Cyprus against the Turks v.'as launched the next month
prompting Ankara to threaten to land its forces in Cyprus.
In March 1964, a United Nations force was established and
sent to the island. However, its presence stopped neither
the violence nor the economic blockade the Greeks had newly
imposed on the Turks who by now had withdrawn to a number
of enclaves on the island. Having been deterred by the
United States from intervening in Cyprus, the Turkish
government found itself in the frustrating position of being
unable to influence the Greek Cypriots directly. Ankara
had to rely on putting diplomatic pressure on Greece to keep
Makarios in line. Another device v;as to retaliate by
harassing the Greeks in Istanbul. Turkey terminated a
previous agreement and started to expel the Greek citizens
while intimidating those Greeks v/ith Turkish citizenship.
However, after another particularly bloody Greek attack on
the Turks of Kokina, Turkish jets bombed Greek military tar-
gets in a limited but effective mission. In 1965, after
several mediation efforts v;ere undertaken by the United Nations
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and the United States an uneasy quiet marred by occasional
fighting settled on Cyy^rus.
Makarios had a knack for shrov7d timing, by having the
first wave of violence in 1963 coincide with weak governments
in Greece and Turkey, both of which were beset by domestic
problems. Similarly, when violence flared up for a second
time in 1967, a military junta had assuraed povrer in Athens,
In November, the Creeks inflicted heav^/ casualties in a
Turkish village in Cyprus. Turkey issued an ultimatum to
Greece accompanied by the full mol^ilization of her forces.
This time, Greece and Makarios gave in.^*^ The illegal
army composed of Greek regulars v;as v/ithdrawn from the is-
land. The economic blockade was terminated. The Cypriot
Turks, who since December 1963, 3iad suffered immensely in
their enclaves, announced the formation of a provisional
Turkish Administration with the aim of managing community
affairs. They had nov; achieved a geographical division of
tlie island.
Intercommunal negotiations started in April 1968,
and by September 1970 the fourth round liad been resumed.
The Turkish viev/s had evolved toward a Cyprus federated
state v/ith the central government in charge of foreign policy
defense, and economics, and the tv/o communities enjoying
^"^The Turkish army is stronger than the Greek.
^^Thouqh there were no further explosions of fighting,
the talks have not produced a definitive settlement by 1974.
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complete autonomy. This seems to be a reasonable solution
since the "dual" system proposed by the 1960 constitution
was inapplicable in Greek eyes, and the "unitary" system
was not tolerated by the Turks. VThether the Greek Cypriots
and Makarios have given up hopes for annexation with Greece
is less clear. However, they realize that it is impossible
to forcefully impose an arrangement on the Cypriot Turkish
community contrary to its and especially Turkey's wishes.
Turkey, the United States and the Conflict
From the onset of the violence on Cyprus, Turkey
tried to have the dispute considered by the NATO allies and
especially by the United States. The peace-force proposals
of NATO were rejected by Makarios, mainly due to his deter-
mination to avoid the alliance bargaining context of the or-
ganization, but it \ias the reluctance of her allies to exert
themselves toward a settlement of the dispute between two
of their members that disappointed Turkey.
Above all, however, it was the refusal of the United
States to come out in support of the Turkisli side that caused
the greatest disillusionment. In the first phase of the
conflict, Turkey saw the necessity of intervening in the
island on four occasions in order to stop the indiscriminate
killing of the Cypriot Turks. It was prevented from doing
so mostly by the promises of the United States that the
United Nations would act decisively to alleviate the situation.
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In June 1964, Ankara warned for the fourth time that it was
about to use its right of intervention under Article IV of
the Treaty of Guarantee in order to restore order on the
island. President Johnson dispatched a letter dated June 5,
1964 to the Turkish prine minister Inonu which not only
halted this first actual preparation for intervention but
also changed the very nature of the Turkish-American
friendship from then on.
The Johnson letter had tv;o crucial points. First,
Turkey v/as reminded of the bilateral agreement regulating
American military assistance (see p. 26). Mr. Johnson said:
"Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July
1947, your government is required to obtain United States'
consent for the use of military assistance for purposes
other than those for \7hich such assistance was furnished. . .
I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot
agree to the use of any United States supplied military
equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present
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circumstances." ' This coarse reminder of the less than
independent status of Turkey v/as accompanied by a remarkable
assertion concerning NATO reaction: ". . .a military
intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct
involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand
^^Documents, The Institute of International Relations,
University of Ankara. The Turkish Yearbook of InJ^j^J^lfL^ipilg.!
Relations 1966 (TVnkara: Ankara Universitesi Basimovi, 1969),
p. "l40".
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that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider
whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against
the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in
Soviet intervention without the full consent and under-
standing of its NATO allies. ""^^
On June 14, prime minister Inonu informed the United
States that Turkey had postponed the decision to exercise
its right of unilateral action in Cyprus, no doubt a pain-
ful admission of v^eakness. After reviewing Turkish and
American attitudes in the conflict, he discussed NATO:
"Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes
upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to
the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The
only point left to the discretion of the member states is
the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO members
should start discussing the right or wrong of the situation
of their fellov;-member victim of a Soviet aggression,
v;hether this aggression was provoked or not and if the deci-
sion on whether they have an obligation to assist this mem±)er
should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion,
the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and,
it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if
it is to carry any weight, should come into being iirjnediately
upon the occurence of aggression. That is why. Article V of
"^^Ibid.
,
pp. 139-140.
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the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of
the member states as an attack against them all, and makes
it imperative for them to assist the party so attacked by
taking forthwith such action as they deem necessary . "'^^
Inonu then elaborated on an understanding of law, asking
the United States whether it "should not have reminded
Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by herself, of the
necessity to abide by the precept 'pacta sunt servanda'
which is the fundamental rule of international law."'^^
It was difficult for Turks to comprehend why their
best friend would fail to support them in a major crisis
in which they judged themselves to be legally right. They
realized the delicacy of the situation for the United
States since both Turkey and Greece were NATO mem.bers
. Yet,
preventing Turkey from using her treaty-given right while
taking no measure against Greece or Makarios to bring about
a definite change on the island was interpreted by the
political parties, the leadership, tlie press, and the public
as an Tunerican endorsement of Enosi s
.
Professor Armaoglu theorisjes that the behavior of the
United States had been based on a mistaken assessment of the
relative stability of Greece and Turkey; that the church and
the monarchy were viewed as the pillars of stability in Greece
'^'"Vali, Turkish Straits and NATO
, pp. 319-320.
^^Ibid., p. 317.
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v/hile the 1960 coup in Turkey was taken to indicate a pre-
carious situation. By 1965, however, the general elections
put a strong majority government in office in Ankara whereas
civilian rule was interrupted in Greece by a military coup
in 1967."^^
At this point, it is useful to note that after Cyprus
became an independent state, Makarios adopted neutrality
as the foreign policy direction, and carefully cultivated
relations with the non-aligned countries, rioreover,
Cyprus had a well-organized communist party, AICEL, whose
prospects looked much better within an independent Cyprus
than v.dthin a Cyprus annexed to Greece. Given, further, the
interest Moscov; exhibited toward maintaining the independence
of Cyprus, it is safe to assume that the United States
regarded Enosi s as a means of perpetuating the pro-West,
democratic character of the strategically located island.
In 1964, shortly after the exchange of letters, the
United States arranged a meeting betv/een the disputants in
Geneva, v/here Secretary of State Dean Jvcheson submitted a
plcin proposing Enosis
,
except for the northeast peninsula
which would become a Turkish-owned military base on Cyprus,
and the cession of a tiny Greek island to Turkey along the
Fahir Armaoglu, "Turkey and the United States: A
New Alliance," The Institute of International Relations,
University of Ankara, The Turkish Yoarhook of International
Relations 1965 (Ankara; Ankara Universitesi Basimevi, 1968),
p. 9.
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Turkish southv/estern coast. Turkey showed a willingness to
accept the plan as a basis for negotiations but Makarios
rejected the plan because of its recognition of the Turkish
demand for partition, and it was dropped.
The next year, the United Nations General Assembly
voted on the Cyprus issue. By this tirae the United States
had realized the extent of Ankara's indignation over Johnson's
letter. The dashed hopes of Turkey had prompted the govern-
ment to mend its fences with the Soviet Union. Consequently,
the United States voted v/ith Turkey against the 1965 resolu-
tion v/hich emphasized the inviability of tlie independence
and territorial integrity of Cyprus, seemingly rebuking
the Turkish government's emphasis of the present force of
the 1960 London-Zurich Treaties.
By the time the second wave of violence broke out on
the island in 1967, the United States had reassessed the
situation. It realized that Turkey could not be asked to
stop her plans for establishing a beachhead on the island a
second time. Cyrus Vance worked feverishly as the special
United States envoy to quell the hot tempers. Greece was
reminded that she would undoubtedly be the loser in any
two-sided confrontation with Turkey. This time, Greece and
Makarios gave in, and met the demands of the Turkish ultima-
tum which called for the removal of the illegal Greek army
and the recall of general Grivas, the terrorist leader,
from Cyprus. Due to the strong objections of Makarios, how-
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ever, the National Guard was not dismantled.
Thus, the Cyprus crisis had a profound impact on
Turkish-jv^aerican relations. The special relationship with
the United States had been tlie basic pillar of Turkey's
foreign policy after the second World War. Turks had never
really analyzed the nature and limits of this friendship
critically. Yet in the first major crisis of foreign
policy that the Turks faced since the difficult days of the
Soviet threats in 1945-46, the close friend failed to
deliver. As if this was not enough of a shock, Turkey was
told by the United States that the collective security sys-
tem she belonged to would not respond if she v/ere attacked
by the prime enemy. The repercussions of this jolt were to
have great significance in the next few years for Turkish-
American relations, and Turkish foreign policy in general.
More immediately, Ankara turned its attention to the dormant
ties with the northern neighbor.
Turkey, the Soviet Union and the Conflict
Ever since the foundation of the Cypriot RepuJ^lic in
1960, the Soviet Union had been a sympathizer of the deter-
mination of Makarios to establish a policy of non-alignment
for Cyprus. After the outbreak of violence in December
1963, the Soviets regarded Turkish jet flights and threats of
intervention as a prelude to a possible NATO plan to bring
the island under Turkish protection. During this period.
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the Soviets repeatedly informed Turkey and its western all
that a Turkish intervention will be regarded as an
-invasi
of the island, and that the Soviets could not remain indif-
ferent to such an occurence in the Mediterranean. In fact,
the Soviets announced that a military aid agreement had
been signed between Moscow and Cyprus in SeptemJ^er 1964
, and
Russian arms had started to reach the Cypriot Greeks via
Egypt.
Turkish-Soviet relations had shown a slight improvement
after the 1960 revolution in Turkey, but the Turks decided
to approach the Soviets only after the arrival of the American
President's letter in June 1964. The Turkish foreign mini-
ster made a trip to Moscow four months later. The two sides
agreed to expand commercial and cultural contacts, but more
importantly the communique referred to the necessity for
"respect to the undertakings born from treaties," and "adher-
ence to the fundamental human rights."'^'* On the Cyprus issue,
it mentioned the existence of "tv7o national communities and
75their legal rights." Moscow evidently prized the prospect
of jjTiproved relations with Turkey. On the other hand, soon
after the Moscov.- visit, Turkey "realized" a loss of interest
in the current project of NATO to establish a multilateral
The Turco-Soviet Communique of November 6, 1964,
The Institute of International Relations, University of
Ankara , The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 1964
(Ankara: Ankara Basimevi, "196 6") , pT 170
.
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force in the Mediterranean (seep. 57). The foreign mini-
ster reminded the press that the question was a source of
friction betv/een the big pov/ers such as the United States,
Britain, and France, and stated: "Let these big powers settle
their differences of view first, then we will decide whether
or not to join the MLF."^^ ^^.^^ rj,^^^^^ formally declined
to participate in the force, a State Department spokesman
called it a "psychological loss for the VJest."^"^
More exchanges between Soviet and Turkish leaders
followed in 1965. In January, a delegation of the Supreme
Soviet paid a visit to Ankara. This V7as follov;ed in May by
the visit of foreign minister Gromyko. Three months later,
Turkish prime and foreign ministers returned the call. In
each case, the communiques issued referred to the "rights
of the tv7o communities" on the island, and a "federal" solu-
tion to the problem was endorsed by the Soviet foreign
minister. To its credit, by taking the initiative, Turkish
diplomacy had brought about a favorable change in *Ioscov;'s
policy toward Cyprus within a year.
Turkey and Cyprus in the United Nations
Turkish diplomacy was not as successful in influencing
the outcome c,' :he Cyprus debates v/ithin the foruias of the
United NationL' . Following the outbreak of violence on the
Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1964 , n. 2 45.
77Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1965, p. 221.
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island in 1963, the Turkish government had sought to have the
dispute considered within the allied and regional context of
NATO. However, the Greek Cypriots were determined to place
the issue within the confines of the world organization where
they hoped to find considerable support for their position.
Within days after the first massacre of the Cypriot Turks
on Decenloer 1963, the Cypriot government asked the Security
Council to intervene in the matter.
The Cypriot government representing the Greek inhabi-
tants, and the Turkish government representing the island-
Turks both presented several legal arguments in support of
their respective cases. The Greek Cypriots aimed to under-
mine the validity of the 1960 Agreements, but more importantly,
they sought to have the Security Council take a stance
against the treaties. In three basic arguments, the legality
of the treaties, the legality of the relationship between the
treaties and the United Nations Charter, and finally, the
legality of the relationship between the treaties and inter-
national lavy? were challenged.
According to the riakarios government, the legality of
the constitution and the treaties it incorporated v/ere to be
contested because a) they were "foisted" on the Cypriot
people; b) they were "inequitable and unequal"; and c) the.
articles stipulating the intervention of third-party states
were incompatible vvith Cypriot "sovereignty" and "independence".
Hence , the constitution and the treaties v/ere to be con-
sidered void on each account.
Although it is true that the representatives of the
two communities joined the drafting of the Zurich-London
Agreements actively only in the last stages, this writer
feels that they certainly were not "coerced=' into signing
the treaties. Moreover, in drafting the constitution they
fully participated in the year- long work of the joint com-
mission. Students of international law indicate the idea
that international treaties are not rendered void by reason
of coercion. They note that v/hile the 19 60 settlement
followed a period of violence, it v/as not obtained by force.
Likewise, they dismiss as legally invalid the suggestions
that "unequal" treaties are ipso facto void and that "coer-
cion" is evident v;hen parties must conclude agreements from
unequal bargaining positions
.
"^^ As to the articles of inter
vention, they v/ere a condition of independence. Such a pro-
cedure v;as not illegal although politically a hindrance to
the Makarios government.
On a different level, the Greek Cypriots attempted to
discredit the 1960 Agreements by charging tliat these v;ere in
conflict v/ith article 2:4 in the Charter of the United
7 8Linda Miller, Cyprus: The Lav; and Politics of
Civi l Strife
,
Occasional Papers in International Affairs,
Numi^er 19 (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University, 1968), p. 15.
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Nations prohibiting the threat or use of force and Article
2:7 stipulating domestic jurisdiction. The argument was that
since Cyprus, as a member of the United Nations, enjoys
"equal rights of full independence and sovereignty.
. . as
prescribed by the Charter—including
, of course, the right
of self-determination, the three guarantor states, in
voting to admit the Cyprus Republic as a member of the
United Nations, have abdicated any claim to enforce the
1960 treaties. Contrary to such assertions, the Charter
neither presumes the automatic invalidation of treaties
signed betv;een states before they join the United Nations,
nor does it "prescribe" tlie "right of self-determination."
Finally, the Cypriot government alleged that the
right of intervention given to Turkey is not only in conflict
with the Charter which prohibits the threat or use of force,
but also with "peremptory norms of international lav;." Des-
pite much maneuvering by the Greek Cypriot representatives,
the Security Council has repeatedly refused to pass judgment
on the validity of the treaties in question.
The Turkish representatives, on the other hand, empha-
sized the fact that without the role of Turkey, Cyprus could
not have gained independence from Britain in the first place.
Secondly they pointed out that the treaties were not open to
^^Letter of Zenon Rossides, foreign minister of
Cyprus, New York Times, 26 June 1964.
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unilateral abrogation. Furthermore, the Turks had no doubts
that the independence of Cyprus and the Treaties guarantee-
ing this independence constituted a solution which was in
conformity with the right of self-determination, with thie
principles of the United Nations Charter, and v;ith the need
to safeguard the friendship and cooperation between Turkey
81and Greece." Rejecting the Greek contention that the
treaties v/ere "forced upon" the Cypriots , the Turks further
disagreed with Makarios on the interpretation of the
Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee (see page 79).
The Article states that in case of a breach of the Treaty of
Guarantee if concerted action among Greece, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom proves impossible, then each of the three
states v7ould have "the right to take action" in order to
restore the provisions set forth in the J^.greements . Accord-
ing to Makarios, "action" signified only nonforceful measures.
Referring to the stationing of Greek, British, and Turkish
contingents on the island as allowed under the treaties, how-
ever, the Turks maintained that the three states had in mind
the possible use of some kind of force, and that limited uses
of force would not be inconsistent v/ith the Charter of the
United Nations. Furthermore, the Turkish government insis-
tently accused the Greek Cypriots of having failed to imple-
^^Information Office, Turkish Views on the Report
QjJtll^.JjlL^"^g5LiL^-^^Q"^ ilodiatbr on Cyprus (V/ashington ,
D.C. :
Turkish Embassy, 1965), p. 2.
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ment the constitution; and of having perpetrated calculated
and provocative policies of oppression and segregation. It
also emphasized the anti-constitutional character of the
thirteen amendments proposed by Makarios in so far as
these aimed at changing the bases of the status of affairs
established by the 1960 treaties. Indeed, such major
alterations v/ere specifically prohibited by Article 182
of the Cypriot constitution.
The deliberations in the Security Council had mixed
results for the two protagonists. Of the numerous resolutions
passed by the Council betv/een 19G4 and 1970
, tv/o had poli-
tical significance for the parties concerned. The rest
called for routine extensions of period for the United
Nations Peace-keeping Force stationed in Cyprus.
The resolution of 4 March 1964 called upon the mem-
bers to refrain from any action or threat of action likely
to worsen the situation in the "sovereign" Republic of
Cyprus. The reference to article two of the Charter v;hich
prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state seemed to
have been directed against Turkey. The government of
Cyprus was asked to take the necessary measures to stop vio-
lence and bloodshed. The resolution also recomjnended tlie
creation of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force, and the
82
appointment of a mediator.
^
^Document, Turkish Yearbook 1964 , pp. 162-163
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The second resolution of importance canie inimediately
after the Turkish jots bombed Greol: military targets on the
island in order to halt the systematic extermination of
the Kokina village Turks. The Security Council urgently
appealed to the government of Turkey on August 9, 1964,
"to cease instantly the bombardment of and the use of mili-
tary force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the Government
of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to
cease firing immediately."^^ Thus, the Council did not he-
sitate to take a strong stand against the use of limited
force by Turkey despite the fact that she enjoyed such a
right under a recognized international treaty. "The Coun-
cil's 1964 debate revealed that the majority of states
regard the Turkish government's unilateral claims under
Article IV as in abeyance so long as the United Nations re-
mains seized of the Cyprus conflict. "^^ The Turkish govern-
ment found this attitude highly unsatisfactory since the
Council, v/hile insisting on the suspension of the interven-
tion article, was unable to liave Makarios halt the killing
in Cyprus
.
However, the legal basis of the Turkish case, the
principle of "pacta sunt servanda", was never questioned. In
fact, by refusing to pass judgment on the 1960 treaties, the
^^Ibid.
, p. 165.
^^'Miller, Cyprus
,
p. 19.
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Security Council frustrated the Cypriot government's desire
to obtain a resolution declaring that Turkey had no right to
use force under Article IV. Such a resolution would have
bolstered the Cypriot renunciation of the Treaty of Guarantee.
Having failed to achieve a pro-Greek resolution from
the Security Council, the Cypriot government turned its
attention to the' General Assembly. It V7as here that Makarios
so skillfully capitalized on prevailing political sentiments.
Ever since the upsurge of nationalism in the early sixties,
the newly independent states of Africa and other continents
had come to command the majority of the votes in the Gen-
eral Assembly. Mostly, these were small states frequently
beset by minority problems. In foreign policy, they had
joined the ranks of those pursuing a policy of neutrality,
and together were referred to as the non-aligned Third World
countries
.
It was this group that the Greek Cypriot representa-
tives had in mind when they announced their intention to
bring the dispute to the attention of the First Committee
of the General Asseml^ly during the 1965 session. Prior
to the convening of the Assembly, the Cypriot government cir-
culated a memorandum called Declaration of Intention v;hereby
it promised to "(1) adopt a Code of Fundamental Rights to pro-
tect the minority; (2) permit the Turkish Cypriots to parti-
cipate in parliament on the basis of proportional represen-
tation; (3) authorize the minority to direct "the education.
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culture, religion (and) personal status" of its members;
and (4) accept a United Nations Commissioner to oversee the
protection of the minority's rights, for a limited period. "^^
This conciliatory approach was coupled with a persis-
tent effort to harp on themes like self-determination, and
non-interference. According to the Cypriot delegation's
presentation before the First, or the Political Committee,
"The issue before the Committee was not whether
Cyprus should or should not be united or associate
with some other country but whether it v/as
entitled to its rights under the United Nations
Charter, whether interference in the internal
affairs of Cyprus should be tolerated and whether
Cyprus v;as an equal Member of the United Nations.
If Cyprus v/as made a second-class Member, that
might set a precedent for other States, the cause
of Cyprus v;as tlie cause of all small States in the
United Nations. "^^
Similarly, the London-Zurich Agreements v/ere referred to as
treaties established at the end of colonial rule using
coercion against the weaker party.
The Turkish side, on the other hand, could not rally
much political support for the "pacta sunt ser\^anda" argu-
ment. A return to the status quo seemed to be unacceptable
not only to the members of tlie Third V7orld, but also to the
Soviet Union and the United States. Despite the fact that
the international press coverage of the Cyprus conflict was
^^Ibid.
,
p. 20.
^^United Nations, General Assembly, 20th Session,
^
^:.J:^J? of the 1407th Meeting: First Committee
,
Tl Deccri}:)er 1965
, p. 334.
105
adequate in exposing the atrocities being committed against
the island-Turks, despite also the fact that tlie legal
basis of the dispute gave Turkey a strong case, /mkara found
itself politically alienated. If this was partly due to the
skilled exploitation of the sympathies of the Third World
by Makarios, it was also attributable, in a larger sense,
to the general direction of Turkish foreign policy. Since
becoming an ally of the West in the post-World War Two years,
Turkey had consistently sided with the developed and colonial
Western states at the expense of the interests of their
non-industrial colonies and the Middle Eastern Arabs.
(see p. 43). In contrast, under the presidency of Makarios,
the governm.ent of Cyprus had carefully cultivated its ties with
the neutralists since the inception of Cyprus in 1960.
The Turks were too late in realizing that within the
confines of the General Assembly, they looked less appealing
than their adversary. In October 1964, however, an indication
of things to come at the United Nations emanated from the
Second Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Uon-
Aligned Countries in Cairo. In a regular press conference
in Ankara, the spokesman of the foreign ministry indicated
that although tv/o Turkish ambassadors specially sent to
the summit were not admitted as official observers, they
87
were closely following the conference. Furthermore, the
on
Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1964, p. 236.
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communique issued at its close mentioned the "unrestricted
and unfettered sovereignty and independence" of Cyprus.
Premier Inonu correctly interpreted this as favoring Makarios
and Greece over Turkey in the Cyprus issue. A number of
goodwill missions v/ere then dispatched to Africa, but
evidently no immediate benefits accrued to Turkey in regards
to the conflict.
In the meantime, at the United Nations, follov/ing the
deliberations, the Political Committee submitted a draft
resolution to the General Assembly .clearly supporting the
Cypriot Greeks, the resolution recalled the relevant parts
of the Cairo Declaration adopted by the Non-Aligned countries
in 1964, and the Ilarch 1965 report of the United Nations
mediator submitted to the Secretary-General. The latter
had caused such extreme irritation in Turkey because of its
pro-Greek one-sidedness that Ankara considered the services
of Galo Plaza, the mediator, to have lost their effectiveness,
leading to his subsequent resignation. Noting further, the
Declaration of Intention circulated by the Cypriot Greeks,
the resolution took cognizance "of the fact that the Republic
of Cyprus, as an equal riem.ber of the United Nations, is, in
accordance v/ith the Charter of the United Nations, entitled
to enjoy, and should enjoy, full sovereignty and complete •
,.88
independence without any foreign intervention or interference,"
^^United Nations, General Assembly, 20th Session, Offi-
cial Records of the 1402nd Plenary Meeting , 18 December 1965,
p. C
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and went on to call upon "all States, in conformity with
their obligations under the Charter, and in particular,
Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 4, to respect the sovereignty,
unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic
of Cyprus, and to refrain from any intervention directed
against it."^^
Resolution 2077 was adopted by the Assembly in a vote
of forty-seven to five v-zith fifty-four abstentions. The
breakdovm of the vote v;as as follows:
In favor : Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile,
Congo (Brazzaville)
,
Congo (Democratic
Republic of), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus,
Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Greece, Guinea, Haiti, India, Ivory
Coast, Jamaica, Kenya Lebanon, Liberia,
Malav;i, Mali, Nepal, Nigeria, Panama,
Paraguay, Rav.'anda, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda,
United Arab Republic, United Republic of
Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Yugosla-
via, Zambia.
Against : Albania, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, United
States.
Abstain-
jCngl Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Byelorussian SSR, Canada, China, Colombia,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuv/ait, Laos, Libya,
Luxembourg, Ilalaysia, riauritania, Ilexico,
Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
89lbid.
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Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Spain,
Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia,
Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Kingdom,
Venezuela. 9 0
Although the large number of states abstaining from the
resolution indicated that Turkey's claims were not defini-
tively rejected, the alienation she was confronted with
caused sharp reaction in the country. The Third World
states were clearly more concerned v.dth principles of "inde-
pendence" and "sovereignty" than principles of international
law. The new prime minister Demirel said the recommendation-
resolution was "contrary to justice, law, and international
agreements, and for this reason inapplicable."^^
Apart from causing a crisis of m.ajor proportions for
Turkey, the developments in Cyprus thus had produced first
the Johnson letter of 1964 informing Turkey that she could
neither use her American supplied v/eapons nor could rely on
NATO in case of a Soviet attack, and then an evidence of
non-support for Turkish diplomacy in the United Nations.
^Qibid.
^
-^Chronology Turkish Yearbook 1965
, p. 265.
CHAPTER V
RE-EXAMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY 19 65-1970
A Reassessnent of Policy Toward the United States and NATO
In itself a low point for Turkey, the Cyprus crisis
had several beneficial results for the country's foreign
policy. First and foremost was the urgent need to reassess
the relations with the United States in light of the
startling letter from the American president. That it took
a major blunder by the State Department to prompt the
Turkish leadership to initiate a careful study, fifteen
years late, of its ties uith its main ally v/as, naturally,
not to the credit of Turkish diplomacy.
If the pursuant grand debate v;as practically forced
upon the politicians, the intelligentsia, the press and the
public, the prevailing conditions in the country were
greatly conducive to accomodate such discussion. Ever since
the inauguration of the nev; constitution after the May 1960
revolution, an era of unprecedented freedom of expression
and thought had been ushered in. The revolution itself re-
presented a critique of the previous regime's domestic
policies. Furthermore, the long-suppressed leftists were •
staging a conback not only by influential publications, but
also by launching a Turkish Workers Party. As a small but
articulate vocal group, the leftists contributed much to the
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public debates by their enthusiasm to question and criti-
cize established authority and institutions. Indeed, a
"new order" based on ''left of center" politics and a "planned
economy" becarae the rallying themes of intellectual dis-
course.
Despite this atmosphere, the field of foreign policy
had not taken a central position v/ithin v/idespread discus-
sions until the eruption of violence in and the consequent
developments about Cyprus. One notable exception, however,
V7as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As had been pointed out
before, the Soviet Union's attempt to bring in the American
Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey as another element in a
possible bargaining v/ith the United States over the removal
of Soviet missiles from Cuba had marked the first time Turkish
leaders, civil and military, v/ere compelled to realize the
risks as well as the security involved in maintaining NATO
and American v;eapons and installations in the country.
Although the left had capitalized on the incident in empha-
sizing the dangers of belonging to a military bloc, the repu-
tation of the United States had rem.ained, in general, mostly
untarnished.
The Cyprus conflict proved to be the turning point in
Turkish-American relations for tliree reasons: a) the United
States failed to nut its weight behind the Turkish side, and
in fact, subtly supported the thesis of Enosis ; b) Washington
denied Turkey the use of ?jnerican supplied v;eapons and equip-
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ment (that is nearly all of Turkey's military assets) in
a conflict directly affecting Turkish national interests
but disapproved of by the United States? and c) the United
States told Turkey that NATO, the cornerstone on which
Turkey's defense rested, would not aid her if she were
attacked by the Soviet Union, the official enemy of the col-
lective security system, as a result of the Cyprus conflict.
VThat ensued amounted to a national outrage directed
against the United States. Street demonstrations by univer-
sity students became a commonplace occurrence
,
grov/ing vio-
lent in protesting the visits of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The
foreign policy elite as vrell as the politicians in the par-
liament initiated a multi-sided debate that v/as fully
publicized by the press.
The intense interest in evaluating the nature of the
Turkish-American ties, and determining the limits of the
cooperation and its purposes—both of these directed the
course of the debate tov:ard the bilateral agreements signed
over the years between the two countries (see Chapter Two
,
pp. 28-29 ). There v;ere tremendous pressures on the legisla-
ture and the political parties to hold public hearings on a
series of secret executive agreements that had never been
ratified by the National Assembly. Direct negotiations
betv;een Turkey and a reluctant United States began in 1967,
and tv7o years later the Cooperation Agreement concerning
Joint Defense V7as signed in Ankara. The nev; agreem>ent tried
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to bring some sort of cohesion to the fifty-four bilateral
agreements. Tribute V7as paid to the principle of "mutual
respect for the sovereignty and the equal riahts" of the
parties; it V7as recognized that the Turkish government
retained "property rights" of the base areas, that it could
"inspect" these installations, and had to "approve" of
their functions and aims.'^^ military and civilian personnel
was obliged to obey the Turkish law. In practical terms,
the day to day operations of the bases, novr called the joint
defense installations, as well as the control over nuclear
weapons remained exclusively in American hands. One major
base in southern Turkey did not acquire a "joint" character,
and is still under the exclusive control of the United
States Strategic Air Force. Even in times of national
emergency, Turkish control was qualified. According to
Article Fourteen, in such cases, the government had the
right to take "restrictive" measures v;ith regard to Ameri-
can utilization of the bases in question. As to the sensi-
tive issue of determining whether an American soldier commit-
ting a crime v/as on duty or not, the Turkish authorities now
acquired a voice in the investigations although not the right
92
Ilaydar Tunckanat, Ikili An lasmalarin Icynzu [Inside
Information on the Bilateral Agreements! ^fAnkara: Ekim
Yayinevi, 1969)
, pp. 334-354.
^^However, the United States was not permitted to
utilize the facilities of this base in its October 1973
air lift to assist Israel against Egypt.
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4x)eOverrule the American military's claims of jurisdiction.
;^.>*i^ther negotiations over this and other bilateral agree-
ments are understood to have become a continual operation
•v;ithin the Turkish ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1969.
^Together with the different facets of the Turkish-Amer-
ican relationship, the topic of NATO and Turkey's ties to this
(Organization received critical attention. Due to its NATO
:membership, Turkey had felt its options significantly limited
as far as both decision-making and implementation processes
were concerned during the Cyprus crisis. First of all, since
both Turkey and Greece v/ere members, the West found the
prospect of any clash between the two highly embarrassing,
^nd also very detrimental to the stability of its southeastern
flank. Second, it v/as brought home to Turkey that she could
use the weapons given her through NATO only against the
Soviet Union and with United States approval. In other V7ords,
-theoretically speaking, Turkey could not be militarily
engaged in minor clashes against its non-Soviet sea and
land borders. Third, even if she were free to use her mili-
tary might, Turkey realized that she V7as actually incapable
of executing a beach-landing on Cyprus. For one thing,
having 'assigned" fifteen out of her seventeen divisions to
the command of NATO, she first had to withdrav; some of its.
troops (this v/as duplicated by Greece). For another, the
Mavy did not have any lightweight landing gear.
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These shortcomings raised previously iinconsidered
questions. Did IIATO meet Turkish defense interests, or was
common defense incompatible with national defense reauire-
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ments? what were the aims of national defense? Was
security the only consideration, or did the furtherance
of other national interests and the socio-economic develop-
ment of the country have to be taken into account? Was it
necessary to maintain an unproportionately large amy, the
third largest in ITATO, while being the poorest country within
that organization?
Debating the problems of national defense v^as truly
an unprecedented phenomenon in Turkey. V7ith grov/ing avjare-
ness of the issues, doubts about the compatibility of NATO
and national defense interests increased. These v:ere espe-
cially heightened when the guiding strategy of NATO, the
"massive retaliation," was abandoned in favor of the "flexible
response" principle. The forraer had envisaged an immediate
and all-out response against any Soviet aggression. Due to
its exposed frontier position, tJiis was particularly suitable
for Turkish defense needs. The new strategy, on the other
hand, called for a coml^ination of conventional and nuclear
response escalating gradually through several echelons. It
^'^Haluk Ulman, "Turk Ulusal Savunmasi Uzerine Dusunceler'
[Thoughts Concerning the Turkish National Defense] , Siyasal
Bilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi (V. xxl. No. 4), pp. 205-213.
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was obvious that an attack against the center of llATO would
not be countered either slowly or by the use of conventional
weapons. It was equally obvious to the Turks that the
sparsely populated, mountainous and underdeveloped eastern
section of Anatolia would be a much more likely setting for
this kind of response. That her territory might be traded
against time was a major source of anxiety. Worse, accord-
ing to Western strategists, the flat lands of eastern Thrace
leading to Istanbul and the straits that adjoin the European
section of Turkey with the Anatolian mainland were considered
indefensible. ".
. .in the event of a major Soviet attack
NATO planners envisage the abandonment not only of large
areas in T-astern Anatolia (the Taurus-Zagros chains lie in the
southeast of Turkey) , but also of Thrace v;ith Istanbul and
the northern Straits areas as well; defense would be concen-
9trated on the 7inatolian plateau and the Gallipoli Peninsula.
If that were the aim of its defense strategy, Turkey vv^ould
have no need to continue with the enormous sacrifices she
makes as a NATO memi^er. The question then arises as to whethe
her interests v/ould not be better served by severing her
military ties v;ith IIATO. Needless to say, no Turkish govern-
ment can go along vrith the defense priorities of UhTO men-
tioned above
,
Yet another dimension of anxiety concerning IIATO is
^^Vali, Turkish Strai ts and MATO, p. 89.
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the Turkish observation that in case of an emergency, the
defense of the northern and southern outposts of IJATO,
namely Norxvay and Turkey, would differ from that of the
center, West Germany. "Whereas the center v;ould be defen-
ded at its perimeter (forv/ard strategy)
, the southeast wing
(Turkey) v^ould be defended either "in depth"—that is by
sacrificing Turkish real estate—or not at all."^^
These discrepancies betv/een the defense interests of
Turkey and NATO still are outstanding problems awaiting
solutions. Turkish leaders also show a keen interest in the
Qutcome of the ^j^erican proposal for a mutual and balanced
reduction of forces in mid-Europe. They are mindful of an
increase in Soviet forces around their own borders as a
possil^le consequence of such a reduction in Europe.
By convincing the Turks that a) their interests
differed from those of the United States, that b) the
motives of the latter were suspect, and that c) the military
alliance worked better for Washington than for 7mkara, the
Cyprus crisis has thus marked the beginning of a new stage
in Turkish diplomacy best characterized by its increased
consciousness of previously unsuspected problems of Turkey,
Normalization o f Relations with the Soviet Union
In the fall of 1965, the conservative Justice Party
^^Ibid.
,
p. 121.
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won the elections by a majority. Despite the known pro-
i^erican outlook of the party, the governp.ent decided to
follow the new policy of rapprochement with the Soviet
Union started a year earlier during the coalition period.
In presenting his government's programme to the National
AsseriDly on November 3, 1965, the new prime minister Demirel
stated that to be tied to an alliance or ideology did not
prevent the development of relations with states belonging
to a different alliance or ideology, or with the neutral
states who nov; made up the majority. ^"^
The decision to alleviate Turkey's isolation caused
by the nonsupport of the United States in the Cyprus affair
had prompted Ankara to cultivate its long-neglected ties
V7ith Moscov/. From 1965 on politicians of both countries
exchanged visits. Soviet premier Kosygin's Decer.±)er 1966
trip was returned by Demirel on September 1967. In 1968,
Turkish foreign minister Caglayangil returned a previous
call by his counterpart, and a year later Turkish president
Sunay paid a visit to the Soviet Union. The communiques
issued after these exchanges v/ere sim.ilar in content. Both
sides declared their devotion to the five principles of
Bandung, and general disarmament. In addition, there would
be references to the situation in Cyprus, Vietncim, and the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
^"^Arar, Hukumet Programlari, p. 480.
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Political detente was reinforced by increased economic
cooperation. In 19 G7, an aid agreement was signed v/hich
initiated several major industrial projects in Turkey, and
also provided the country v/ith a much needed outlet for its
farm goods.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 19 6 8 caused
a public outrage in Turkey. Officially, the normalization
of the relations continued, but the crushing of the Prague
spring certainly raised NATO's credibility in many Turkish
eyes
.
Turkey's application of the technical clauses of the
Montreux Convention regulating the use of the straits by
non-Turkish vessels has brought no major complaints from the
Soviet Union. According to the Convention, Soviet v;arships
of any size are allowed through the straits provided that they
pass singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers, and
upon notification of the Turkish government eight to fifteen
days prior to passage. On the other hand, non-Black Sea
states are limited in the tonnage of v;ar ships they can send
to, and the nur.iber of days the ships can remain in, the Black
Sea, Consequently, one viev; is that an impetus for revising
the Ilontreux Convention would today com.o not from the Soviet
^8
Union but from the United States.
^^Ilaluk Ulman, "Turk Dis Politikasina Yon Veren Et-
kenlcr 1923-19G8" [Factors Influencing Turkish Foreign
Policy, 1923-1968], Siyasal R ilgilcr Fahul tesi J>^i_si_
(V. xxiii, No. 3), pp. 264-266.
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The efforts to make the foreign policy more flexible
and multilateral have also brought improvements in Turkey's
relations with the European members of the Socialist Bloc.
From mid-1966 on, the diplomatic traffic between Turkey and
Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, and Poland
grew dramatically. There were substantial developments in
trade, tourism, and cultural fields. Although not to be
interpreted in the direction of the Balkan Entente of the
1930s
,
Turkish diplomacy has definitely embarked upon a
policy of active opening in this area after 1966.
New Emphasis on Turkish-Arab Solidarity
The Cyprus crisis was also instrumental in exposing
the extent of the rift that had developed between Turkey
and many nations of the Moslem vjorld. Despite common histori
cal, religious, and cultural ties, the Arab cooperation with
the Western states in the early twentieth century to rebel
against the rule of the Ottoman Sultan, the latter 's attempts
to suppress this movement, the Republican Turkey's total
break from its Islamic past, and the close identification of
post-1950 Turkish governments with the West which still main-
tained colonial ties with many Arab peoples were the major
factors in shaping Turkish-Arab attitudes. Too, after the
initiation of the Trum.an Doctrine and the Marshall aid, Turke
99 ...
Fahir Armaoglu, "Turk Dis Politikasmda Son Gelis-
melor" [Recent Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy]
,
Dis Politika (March 1971), p. 11.
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liad moved swiftly to recognize Israel v/ith whom she had come
to enjoy mutually satisfactory trade relations by mid-sixties
The Arab displeasure with Turkish foreign policy was demon-
strated not only in the United Nations debates on Cyprus,
but also in the summit meetings of the non-aligned Third
World states. Commenting on his countries relations with
Turkey, the Syrian foreign minister stated the problem
clearly in 1965: "Our attitude is related to Turkey's
relations v/ith Israel. If Turkey insists on not giving
a sincere form to these relations, it v/ould be difficult
to establish desired relations betv.'een Turkey and Syria .'' "'"^'^
Similarly, the Tunisian president Dourguiba reminded Turkey,
during his visit in 1965 , that "First of all, Tur]:ey should
try to understand the problems of the Arab countries and
consider v/hat problems, after having passed the phase of
colonialism, these countries have faced and are facing. . .
Turkey should put all her weight with the Arab countries and
thus make herself accepted. ""^^^
Having received the message, Ankara started to reshape
its Middle Eastern policy. Tliis v;as especially easy for the
nev; government of Demirel which assuraed power in 19 65 l:)y
the support of the conservative and religious rural masses
100Chronology, Turkish Yearbook 1965 , p. 24 6.
^°^Ibid., p. 232.
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Of Anatolia. Presenting the program of the government to
the National Asserably, Demirel announced that all
diplomatic representations have been mutually upgraded to
highest levels, and that the Arab countries could rely
on Turkey's understanding and support in their legitimate
cause.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war provided Turkey v/ith its
first opportunity to display its new policy. The Egyptian
paper El Ahram reported that Turkey will not let the United
States use her bases, and that she v7ould not mass troops
1 n o
at the Syrian border."^ Prime minister Demirel called
for Israeli uithdrav;al and strongly denounced the forceful
acquisition of territory by Israel.
Reaction from the Arab world v/as immediate and favor-
able
,
accompanied by top level exchanges. To have their
president pay a visit, in 1968 to Saudi Arabia including the
holy Mecca was a unique sight for the Turkish people. The
niMuerous joint communiques recorded Turkey's opposition
to the use of force as a means of securing political advan-
tages and territorial gains, and the use of such gains to
impose unilateral solutions. Israel v;as asked to withdraw
from all the occupied Arab territories. In return, the
^^^Arar, Hukumet Programlari , p. 482.
^^^New York Times, 31 May 1967.
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Arab states emphasized adherence to international coiranitments
,
and expressed hope for a just solution based upon the legiti-
mate rights and interests of the two Cypriot communities.^^'*
Turkey, upon being invited, attended the 1968 Interna-
tional Islamic Conference in Rav/alpindi, and the 1969 Islamic
Summit in Morocco. The latter presented Turkey with the
difficult choice of attending the Summit and having to take
a position satisfactory to both sides in a probable clash
between the progressive and the conservative elements, or
not to attend the Summit and risk offending tlie Arab and
other Moslem states.
Indeed, the Turkish-Arab detente was not without its
problems. While eager to improve its standing, Turkey
refused to modify some of her policies v/hich she deemed to
be in her interest. Despite much pressuring from the
United Arab Republic in the 1969 Islamic Summit, Turkey did
not adopt a more militant policy tov/ard Israel and sever
diplomatic relations. Likewise, when the Economic Council
of the Arab League adopted a resolution recommending tl-iat
Turkey replace Israel with Arab countries in her foreign
trade, foreign minister Caglayangil stated tliat his country
would be pleased to improve economic relations with Arab
^ . 105countries
.
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On another issue, Turkey indicated her concern for
the Israeli position on the status of Jerusalem and the
plight of the refugees, but sav; thsese as of interest to the
whole world, separated from political problems. Ankara was
also determined to stay out of strictly inter-Arab conflicts
such as those involving the future of the Persian Gulf, or
the civil v;ar in Yemen. Further, her secularist tradition
as well as the newly found flexibility in her foreign policy
made Turkey reluqtant to approve of plans seeking to
establish a coordinating organization among Islamic nations.
In 1968, a proposal by the president of Somali to set up an
Islaraic Union to examine the military and diplomatic aspects
of problems facing the Moslem world drew a cold response
from the Turkish foreign minister v;ho stated that no alli-
106
ance was necessary among the Moslem states. Similarly,
in the foreign ministerial conference of Islamic countries
in March 1970 Turkey declined to support an initiative
calling for a permanent secretariat for Islamic nations.
Outside of these differences, though, the Turkish
determination to be more considerate of Arab feeling was once
again demonstrated during the critical weeks of warfare
betV7een Jordan and the Palestinian guerillas. The latter
were openly aided by Syria, but Turkey managed to support
•
Jordan without causing ill-feelings in Syria. l^'' It was
^^^ Ibid
. , p. 147, p. 150.
^-^'^Omer Kurkcuoglu, "Turkey's Middle East Policy",
Foreign Policy (June 1971), p. 96.
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y^pprted that Turkey, along with Greece, Italy, and Spain
fcad refused to allow American flights to operate from their
spii during the Jordanian crisis. "'"^^
mth the Nortli African Arab states of Morocco, Algiers,
-Tianisia, and Libya, Turkey enjoyed good relations. How far
she had come in gaining the sympathies of the Arab world
Kas shown at the September 1970 Summit of Non-Aligned
Nations. Unlike the 1964 meeting in Cairo, this one not
pnly refused to endorse a pro-Greek recommendation pushed
hy Makarios, but his fait accompli of having the proposal
fit least read before the adjournment of the meeting drew
wide protests from the Arabs. Turkish diplomacy could take
fpll credit for achieving such results in a matter of six
years.
Modifications in Policy Toward Non-Aligned State
s
The endorsement of the pro-Cypriot Greek resolution
in December 1965 by the General Assembly may be viewed as
an important turning point in Turkish attitudes tov/ard that
body and its main group of constituents, the Third World
states. These states, a majority of which were formed out
of the continually shifting political lines within Africa,
not only sponsored the "independence" and "non-interference"
oriented resolution, but in so doing disregarded the implica-
tion of nonsupport for the "respect for international treaties
^^^New York Times, 1 December 1970.
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and human rights" position of Turkey.
Until this event, Turkish perceptions of the United
Nations were marked by sympathetic identification with the
principles of the Charter, and, at the same time, a realis-
tically low estimate of the political effectiveness of the
organization. Turkey had failed dismally in appreciating
the changes brought by the sixties: the insecurity felt by
the newly independent entities, their resentment of their
recent colonial rulers, their desire to find international
acceptance, and the importance of the General Assembly as a
world forum providing them with an opportunity to express
their opinions, and a vote equal in weight to anybody
else's. By actively utilizing the mechanisms of this egali-
tarian political body, they had obliged the others to pay
closer attention to it. In the process, the General Assembly
had become a genuine mirror of v/orld public opinion.
These changes as well as the gap in Turkey's perception
of them were manifested to her in the diplomatic isolation
the 1965 vote represented. Twenty-eight African, seven
Asian, and nine Latin American countries had supported the
resolution
.
Resolved to recuperate from this alienated position,
Turkey decided to increase its presence in the capitols of
these countries, and also to pay closer attention to the
issues concerning them in the United Nations. Denouncing
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colonialism and racism, the Demirel government of 1965
reaffirmed its allegiance to the United Nations Charter and
the principles of the Bandung Conference, and indicated
that Turkey should introduce its experiences and thoughts
to these aspiring nations. In tlie years to follow, there
v/ere significant increases in cultural, commercial and
touristic exchanges between Turkey and the Arab world, but
only minor advances as far as the more distant African,
Asian, and Latin American states were concerned. First of
all, the best diplomatic efforts of Turkey were spent on
Cyprus until 1968, and on the problems inherent in her
ties with the West after that. Secondly, the financial
resources of the country could accommodate the burden of
increased representation abroad only up to a certain limit.
The foreign ministry tried to help the situation by accredit-
ing one ambassador to more than one country. A similar measure
was tliG visit of the ambassadors of thirteen African states
accredited to Cairo as official guests of the Turkish govern-
ment.
Taking a more active role in the deliberations of the
United Nations, on the other hand, did not entail a heavy
financial drain on the resources of the country. Her unique
position of being a memJDer of both the Western and the Asian
Groups afforded her a measure of added flexibility. The
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Asian Group membership in turn enabled Turkey to be a member
of the Afro-Asian Group, the largest and most influential in
the United Nations, although she was not a member of the
original Group of 77 composed of the developing countries,
and established after the Cairo Declaration of July 1962
in relation with the First Development Decade and the Con-
ference on Trade and Development . •^'^
The Committee in which Turkey was most active is the
Fourth or the Trusteeship Committee. Also called the
Committee on Decolonization, it deals with the question of
Namibia (Southwest Africa) , the territories under Portuguese
administration, Southern Rhodesia, activities of foreign
economic and other interests impeding the implementation of
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, educational and training progarms
for Southern Africa, the numerous non-self governing terri-
tories scattered around the globe. Turkey had been a co-
sponsor of the important Declaration on Decolonialization
in the 1960 session of the United Nations, and had complied
fully v/ith the economic sanctions brought by the Security
Council against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia.
More recently, since its inception in 1967, she has been an
active member of the Council for Namibia.
^^^Yuksel Soylemez, Foreign Policy of Turkey at the
United Nations 1966-1972 (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Press, 1973)
, p. x.
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Since 1966, the Turkish vote on the issues relating
to the Fourth Committee's work has shown a definite pattern.
In 1966, Turkey cosponsored with other Afro-Asian delegations
a draft resolution [A/L 483]
,
calling on the United Nations
to take over the mandate given to South Africa to administer
Southv/est Africa. In 1968, she voted with the Third
World group in condemning governments with relations to
South Africa. ''^
Since 1962, problems of Angola, Mozambique and Ginea
Bissau, all territories under Portuguese administration, have
been discussed in the Fourth Committee. Turkey supported
the freedom and independence of these peoples in principle,
but when the draft resolutions condemned the role of NATO
allies in encouraging Portugal, Turkey abstained in the 1966
and 1967 votes. This was a middle of the road position
between the Third World and a typical grouping of the ex-
colonial countries of Europe and the United States.
In votes concerning the trust territories of Nauru,
Nev7 Guinea, the non-self-governing territory of Papau, the
decolonialization of French Somaliland, Ifni, the Spanish
Sahara, Equatorial Guinea, and the problem of apartheid in
^•'•'-United Nations, General Assembly, 21st Session,
Official Records of the 1419th Plenary Meeting , 27 September
1966, p. 22.
^'^United Nations, General Assembly, 23rd Session,
Official Records of the 1671st Plenary ^leetjmcT, 12 June
r96"8, p7~T,
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Southern Rhodesia, the United Nations blocs have voted in strikingly
consistent patterns. One example suffices to make the point.
In the twenty-second session (1967)
, the resolution recom-
mended by the Fourth Committee [A/6 884] to denounce the
government of Southern Rhodesia, was adopted by the General
Assembly by a vote of ninety-two to two with eighteen absten-
tions. Members of the Third World and Turkey made up the
ninety-two favoring the resolution: Portugal and South Africa
were against it, and Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Great
Britain, United States, Sweden, and Norway were among the
eighteen that abstained. -^-^^
In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkey has repeatedly
denounced Israel and endorsed the November 22, 1967 resolu-
tion of the Security Council calling for the withdrav/al of
Israel from occupied Arab territories. She has sponsored
the Jerusalem Resolution of May 1968 opposing the incorpora-
tion of the whole city of Jerusalem into Israel. Except
for France and Greece, her votes on this issue differed
considerably from those of her other NATO allies. "''^^
Likevrise, with regards to the Vietnam war, Turkey has
repeatedly pleaded for an end to the suffering of these
peoples, and endorsed the 1954 Geneva Accords as a basis for
113United Nations, General Assembly, 22nd Session,
Officia l Records of the 1594th Meeting: Fourth Committee
,
3 Noveml^er 1967
, p. 4.
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Francis Beer, Integration and Disintegration in
NATO (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1969), pp. 26-27.
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agreement.
On the other hand, Turkey has voted with tlie West in
rejecting Peking as the representative of China, in main-
taining United Nations troops in South Korea, and in support-
ing measured toward general disarmament.
Recently, Ankara has sho\^m an interest in eocnomic and
social cooperation between the industrialized and developing
countries. In the tv;enty-fifth session (1970)
,
foreign
minister Caglayangil was critical of the rate of growth pro-
posed in the international development strategy in relation
with the forthcoming inauguration of the Second Development
Decade. At the same time he expressed concern about the
effects of progress on the balance of nature . ^"'"^
In the same session
,
Turkey proposed the establishment
of a new machinery within the United Nations to rapidly
organize assistance and materiel to countries stricken V7ith
natural disasters. According to the Turkish delegate, such
a central and computerized agency would not only be able to
deal with the crisis situations more efficiently in cutting
out duplicate and unusable aid, but also would avoid the
charges of propaganda involved in aid extended by some of the
industrialized countries to developing ones. In the Third
Committee (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural problems), more
than fifty states joined the Turkish proposal, and it was a-
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dopted by the General Assembly.
The active participation of Turkey in many ad-hoc
committees, sub-corronittees
, and drafting committees, her
election to boards and councils have helped her to establish
herself in the mainstream of the United Nations politics.
The non-aligned countries' 1965 vote on Cyprus has induced
Turkey to change her image in the United Nations from non-
committal aloofness to active participation. Since then,
she has become a steady supporter of the Third World regard-
less of the stance taken by her Western allies. In turn,
this policy has helped to enhance her respectability.
116Soylemez, Turkey at the United Nations
, p. xii
.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding chapters demonstrated the pattern of
change within Turkish foreign policy over a period of twenty-
five years. While the Cyprus crisis of the mid-sixties,
in so far as it led to the Johnson letter (informing Turkey
that she could neither utilize the v/eapons given her by the
United States without American approval nor could count
upon NATO assistance in case of a Soviet attack) and the
General Assembly vote of 1965 (indicating the extent of
the alienation that confronted Turkey, was the external
factor immediately responsible for a change of course
within Turkey's foreign policy, the foregoing analysis
aimed to explain the underlying complex interaction betv/een
the domestic and foreign policy developments that led up
to the climatic events of Cyprus.
The domestic politics of Turkey has evolved from the
one party authoritarian regime of the first thirty years
of the Republic (1920-1950), through the two-party
struggles of the fifties to the multi-party liberalism of
the sixties. If it is possible to point to four events and
episodes as the most influential in shaping the political
culture of the country during the fifties and the sixties,
the first one would be the peaceful transfer of pox^er , in
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1950, from the Republican Peoples Party to the newly
formed Democratic Party as a result of the first elections
ever held in the country. The Republican Party had been
founded by Ataturk, and upon his death, Ismet Inonu, the
much respected "pasha" and seasoned diplomat of Ataturk's
cadre, who had then taken over the administration of the
state, and the secretary-generalship of the party. After
thirty years of non-competition, the party lost heavily in
1950 to the four-year old Democratic Party of Menderes.
Much to the astonishment and admiration of his countrymen,
Inonu did not resort to any measures to challenge the ter-
mination of his rule, and calmly assumed the leadership of
the opposition. It was a valuable lesson in the procedures
of democracy; but more importantly, it signified an accep-
tance of the existence of viev; points different than those
pronounced by the official authorities, of their viability,
and of the rights of others to hold them. Altogether, it
contrasted uniquely with the past political traditions of
the country.
However, lessons on democracy seemed to have been lost
on the Menderes regime. After reelection in 1954, the Demo-
cratic Party government initiated a reign of oppression aimed
at smothering its main political opponent, the Republican
Peoples Party, and restricting the independence as well as
the po\-7er of such groups and institutions as the press, the
universities, the bureaucracy, and the National Assembly.
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The resulting polarization of the political scene was only
worsened by the irresponsible determination of Menderes to
exploit religion for partisan purposes by dangerously com-
promising the secularist outlook of the country. Moreover,
by the end of the fifties, the economy had come to a stand-
still as a result of the unplanned and non-production oriented
spending of Menderes, and the inflationary deficit financing
that sustained it. This somber sight of a popular political
party making a brilliant start with promises of political
and economic liberalization, then becoming ruthless oppressors
and dragging the country to the brink of disaster was cer-
tainly an important episode in Turkish politics. Another
dimension that should be immediately mentioned is the i\merican
role vis-a-vis the Menderes regime. It must be borne in mind
that the Menderes regime not only enjoyed the political "pa-
tronage" of the United States, but it also was encouraged
to manage the economy according to the approved capitalistic
model. V/hen that failed, the government was bailed out by
huge loans from the American friend. And yet the United
States kept silent as Menderes scrapped political freedoms.
This American refusal to use its enormous influence on the
Turkish Democratic Party leaders to restrain their political
and economic recklessness was one of the first germs of anti-
T^ericanism planted by the Americans themselves.
The third event carrying major political significance
v/as the army revolution of May 1960 , and the trials of the
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deposed political leaders. The coup was aimed at arresting
the political polarization approaching civil strife, and the
economic unrest. The revolutionary officers took pains to
clarify that the movement was not seeking to affect changes
within Turkish foreign policy, and was not directed against
Turkey's allies, \niile this was undoubtedly true, it could
not have escaped- thoughtful observers that the United States
had approved and supported v>7holeheartedly the policies of
a regime whose entire leadership was now being held to
account for their previous deeds. Thus, while not meant nor
perceived to do so by the Turks at the time, the coup,
nevertheless, contained an implicit critique of the Turkish-
American liasion.
With their revelations of abuses by and the human frail-
ties of once powerful national figures, the trials provided
unusual drama in the flow of politics. But more importantly,
millions witnessed a process in v;hich the political leader-
ship of a decade was asked to justify the compatibility of
many of their decisions and non-decisions v/ith the lav/ of
the land in particular, and v/ith the best interests of the
nation in general. If the events of the 1950 elections
underlined the plurality of interests and views within a
country, the 1960 revolution contained implicitly the con-
cept of accountability, and the norm of domestic interests
of the country.
The fourth major domestic development of the era in
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study, the constitution of 19G1 was a direct consequence of
the revolution. Determined to modify the system which allov^ed
the previous regime to exploit it for partisan purposes,
the National Unity Committee, composed entirely of revolu-
tionary officers, asked a group of respected scholars to
draft a constitution. The new document introduced such
legal-political institutions and procedures as the upper
house (Senate)
,
the Constitutional Court, the State Planning
Organization, and an electoral system based on proportional
representation. Possessing a pronouncedly liberal character,
it strengthened the fundamental rights of the individual and
incorporated the idea of the welfare state. Apart from
bringing these needed changes, however, the constitution of
1961 is significant for two other reasons. First, although
drafted by professors, essentially it embodied the aspira-
tions of a revolutionary group of relatively lov;-ranking
young army officers, reflecting the spirit and direction of
progress they envisioned for their country. Second, in fos-
tering a genuine atmosphere of freedom it generated an out-
burst of public and academic discussions, and a torrent of
new publications. A nev; taste for the critical appraisal
of previously little considered issues, such as the means of
development best suited for Turkey, in its turn prepared the
ground for the concern for and the arguments about the foreign
policy of Turkey that were to be manifested in a couple of
years
.
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Unlike the domestic developments which evolved through
several phases, the foreign policy of Turkey since the end
of the second World War has been consistent in its coopera-
tion with the West. The previous neutrality had to be
abandoned due to the necessity of resisting Soviet pressures
in the long-run. In particular, Turkey sought to shelter
of the American military might in order to counter the Soviet
threat. If security and survival were the main consideration
in determining Turkish interest in an alliance with the
United States, equally important v;as the hope of securing
aid toward the economic development of the country. The
United States and Europe, on the other hand, had their ovm
military and political interests in mind in extending aid to
Turkey in 1947, and in accepting her as a member of the Coun-
cil of Europe in 1949
, and of NATO in 1952. Eager to secure
such assistance, Turkish leaders often neglected to examine
important aspects of this alliance v/itli such results as the
burden of maintaining an unusually large army, and the numer-
ous cidvantages and privileges given to the United States in
a series of bilateral agreements.
Apart from the fact that not every consequence of
cooperation based on mutual needs v/as beneficial to Turkey,
there were other components of the Turkish-American collabora-
tion that did not have their basis in Turkey's needs, and in
fact, v/ere clearly detrimental to Turkish interests. By
agreeing to assume a leading position in the creation of
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CENTO in 1955, Turkey acquired the image of the regional
spokesman for American and British interests in the Middle
East. This was only worsened when Turkey politically en-
dorsed, and militarily assisted the American intervention
in the domestic politics of Lebanon in 1958. By the end
of the fifties, Turkey had won the enmity of the Arab world
not because she had any contentions with them, but because
she had demonstrated an apalling unconcern for their pro-
blems and opinions vis-a-vis the Western states.
Turkey followed a similarly short-sighted policy
toward the non-aligned countries of the world. For the sake
of the /American friendship, she again assumed an unnecessarily
active role in defense of the V7estern alliance. Self-
righteous in the conviction that no state could stay neutral
in a bipolar world, she generally belittled those that v;ere
trying to pursue such a policy.
7.n trying to seek alliances with the West to lessen
the disadvantages of their exposed location, Turkish leaders
did not hesitate to embark upon measures that were bound
to be irritating to the Soviets. Providing the latter 's
main rival v/ith loosely restricted military privileges was
a provocative policy reflecting a lack of consideration for
the long-term interests of the state. Fortunately for the
Turks, after 1953, the Soviet leadership initiated a peace
offensive which, in the case of Turkey, sought to reassure
Ankara that the Soviets had renounced their previous terri-
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torial claims. Regrettably, due to dogmatic views that world
peace was indivisible, and that the security needs of Turkey
were identical with, and could not be separated from those of
NATO, Turkish politicians failed to take advantage of the new
tone in Moscow.
During the 1960s Turkish foreign policy underwent
considerable changes, but in the years before the Cyprus
crisis these were rather unpronounced as compared to the
later years.
Acting as a catalyst as far as its effects on
foreign policy are concerned, the Cyprus crisis arose as
a result of the breakdown of the political and administrative
system foreseen by the 1960 constitution of the island.
Never seriously applied, the complex network of checks
and balances designed to protect the rights of the Turkish
community v;ere officially challenged in a series of thirteen
proposals by the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios . In no
time, the rapidly v/orsening political situation turned
into open and violent attacks against the Cypriot Turks who
were outnumbered five to one. The intensity of fighting and
the losses suffered were highest in 19G4 and again in 1967.
The Turkish government in Ankara could not remain in-
different to the physical attrition of its compatriots in
this strategically located island. On several occasions
between 1964 and 1967, Turkey considered a limited landing
operation on Cyprus. She v/as prevented from doing so by the
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blunt reminder from the United States president that in
order to utilize her American-supplied v/eapons Turkey
needed to secure the approval of that country. At the same
time, Turkey realized that she actually did not possess the
landing equipment her navy would have needed. Thus, she was
completely frustrated in her attempt to influence the
situation in Cyprus by the interference of the United States.
The ensuing disillusionment v;ith regard to the 2\mericans were
only enhanced as the Cyprus question was discussed in the
United Nations. There, Turkey realized that she did not
have the political support of a considerable majority of
nations mainly due to the past record of its excessively
pro-American foreign policy.
There were inklings of change in Turkey's foreign
policy before the Cyprus conflict. Both tiie revolutionary
committee and the following coalition governments exhibited
interest in a cautious relaxation of frigidity toward the
Soviet Union. The latter had renewed its offer of rapprocJie-
ment, and the two sides proceeded on the basis of complete
recognition of Turkey's existing international commitments.
A parliamentary delegation visited Moscow in 1963, and
despite the warm reception the Turks warned their hosts that
no immediate and important progress could be possible between
the two states. With the sudden outburst of the Cyprus
crisis, and the ensuing Turkish disappointment over the letter
from the American president, the improvement of Turkish-Soviet
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relations took a dramatic turn. The foreign minister's
visit in 1964 brought forth a change in Moscow's pro-
Makarios attitude, coupled v/ith an endorsement of the Turkish
emphasis on respect for the 1960 Cyprus treaties which not
only established the new state, but also devised a system
protective of the rights of the Turkish community on the
island and allov/ed Turkey, Greece, and Britain to intervene
in case of an abuse of the system.
Frequent and top-level contacts between the political
leadership of the two countries hastened the thaw. In
return for the Soviet understanding of her position on
Cyprus, Turkey decided to v/ithdraw its support from the
NATO project establishing a multilateral force in the Medi-
terranean, and also moved closer to the Soviet stance in
regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Vietnam vrar.
The political detente was reinforced by economic coop-
eration as an aid agreement initiated several industrial
investment projects by the Soviets, and provided for Turkish
export of agricultural products. The invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia in 196 8 must have supplied a pessimistic note to the
constant search for the real motives of the Soviets; never-'
theless, the two countries had completely normalized their
relationship by the end of the decade.
Between 1960-1970, Turkish attitudes toward long-time
neutrals, newly independent non-bloc countries, and those
striving for independence also underwent a metamorphosis in
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a similar pattern. In the early sixties, this change v/as
characterized by an enhanced avrareness of and identification
with the numerous problems of the developing nations. Tur-
key sympathized with and assisted the Algerian nationalists,
but mostly, the new consciousness was reflected in verbal
official elaborations.
After the Cyprus episode, however, Ankara intensified
its efforts tov;ard the Third VJorld. Although trade and
cultural exchanges between Turkey and some distant African
and Asian states increased, in this respect Turkey was
limited by its ovm financial restrictions. Progress was
most dramatic in the case of the Middle Eastern and North
African Arab states. Diplomatic representations were
mutually upgraded to highest levels along with presidential
and ministerial visits as Turkey adopted a decidedly pro-
Arab behavior in the 1967 war v;ith Israel. l#iile Turkey
was rewarded by the generous political support of the Arabs,
she stopped short of severing its political and mutually
beneficial commercial ties with Israel. By the end of the
sixties, Turkey had become a friend of the Arabs, attending
the Islamic summits, and had acquired the Arab support in
the meetings of the non-aligned states.
All these changes in Turkish foreign policy were
reflected in the United Nations during the same period. Just
as the general policy was lopsided in favor of the United
States and the West, the Turkish participation in the United
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Nations manifested an unncessarily excessive concern for the
interests of her NATO allies and the United States. Apart
from supporting the West on issues relating to the inter-
bloc rivalry (disarmament, regulation of armaments, Korea,
Greece, admission of new members), her vote consistently
favored the colonial, advanced West over the anti-colonial,
underdeveloped Asian, Arab, and African states in such issues
as the right of all peoples to self-determination, the ques-
tion of the French North African protectorates, race conflict
in the Union of South Africa, and Portuguese colonial
enclaves in the Indian subcontinent.
In the 1965 vote of the General Assembly over the
Cyprus conflict, Turkey realized that her previous attitudes
toward the Third World had systematically alienated her
from this influential group in the United Nations. Resolved
to redress this diplomatic isolation, and also taking advan-
tage of her unique position of being a member of both the
Western and the Asian Groups, Turkey assumed an active role
in the general deliberations of the Trusteeship Committee,
and the Council for Southwest Africa. In contrast to the
Western states, including almost all of her NATO allies,
V7hich either voted against or abstained from resolutions
relating to the territories under Portuguese administration,
apartheid in Rhodesia, censoring of South Africa, and the
status of the numerous non-self-governing territories
scattered around the globe, Turkey systematically cast her
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vote with the Third World countries. Thus, by 1970, Turkey
had definitely left behind her previous noncommital aloofness,
and managed to locate herself in the mainstream of the United
Nations politics.
To sum up, we can conclude that in the years covering
her alliance with the West, Turkish foreign policy suffered
from several crucial fallacies and omissions. First, despite
the legacy of the Ottoman political traditions, and the
excellent example of neutrality under Ataturk, Turkey com-
mitted the cardinal error of relying exclusively on one
state, the United States, in its post-World War II policy.
Second, she failed to evaluate the interests of the United
States in this partnership, and used poor judgment in
balancing what its own best interests required with v;hat and
how much to be given to the United States. Third, she
repeated the same mistakes in relation to her ties with
NATO. Fourth, Turkey neglected to determine precisely
the terms of her numerous agreements with the United States
and NATO. Fifth, she did not calculate the costs involved
in exclusive reliance on the United States and the V.'est for
the rest of her relationships with other countries. Sixth,
Turkey failed to analyze international politics from a larger
less self -oriented point of view, and therefore, to detect
the changes and emerging new patterns. And finally, she
failed to appreciate the grievances and problems of those
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states with v/hich she was not allies.
On the basis of this perf orinance , the Cyprus affair,
in so far as it led to the Johnson letter, and the 1965
General Assembly vote, must be regarded more as a blessing
than a defeat. It was the disappointment and the frustra-
tion she v/as confronted with that prompted Turkey to cast
off somnolence
,
and affect the changes and modifications
that her foreign policy badly needed.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allison, Graham. Essence of PGcision: Explaining the Cuban
Missile Crisis
. Boston: Little, Brovm and Co.
,
19717.'
Arar, Ismail. HukTimet Programlari 1020-1965 [Government
Programs 1920-1965]. Istanbul: Burcak Yayinevi,
1968.
Armaoglu, Fahir. Kibris Meselesi 1954-1959 [The Cvprus
Question 1954-1959]. J\ji]:aral Sevinc Matbaasi, 1963.
Ataov, Turkkaya. NATO and Turkey
. Ankara: Sevinc Printing
House, 1970.
~
Avcioglu, Dogan. Turkiye'nin Duzeni [The Order in Turkey].
Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 196 8.
Beer, Francis. Integration and Disintegration in NATO.
Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1969.
Berkes, Niyazi. Devolopm.ent of Secularism in Turkey.
Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964. ^
Campbell, John. Defense of the Middle East: Problems of
American Policy. New Yorlc: Harper and Brothers^
1958.
Dodd, C. N. Politics and Government in Turkey
.
Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969.
Esmer, Ahmet; Bilge, S., Gonlubol, M. ; Sander, 0.; Sar, C;
Sezer, D.; Ulman, H. Olaylarla Turk Pis Politikasi
1919-1965 [Events of the Turkish Foreign Policy
1919-1965]. Ankara: Sevinc Mat})aasi, 1969 .
Prey, Frederick. The Turkish Political Elite . Cambridge:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965.
Gibbons, Scott. Peace Without Honor . Ankara: ADA Publish-
ing House, 1969.
Gonlubol, -Mehmet. Turkish Participation in the United
Nations 1945-T9547 Ankara: Anl^ara Universitesi
Basimevi , 1965
.
Halil, Ali. Ataturkcu Pis Politika ve NATO ve Turkiye
[Ataturkist Foreign Policy and :JATO and Turkey]
.
Istanbul: Gercek Yayinevi, 196 8.
147
Harris, George. Troubled Alliance: Turk ish-J\jnerican
Problems in Historical Perspec-tfiv?r~i'J4b-19 71'. r 7a sh
-
ington D.C.: Araerican Enterprise InstituteT 1972.
Information Office, Turkish Views on the Report of the
United Nations Mediator on Cyprus
. Washington, D.C.
:
Turkish Embassy, 1965.
Institute of International Relations of the Faculty of
Political Sciences at the University of Ankara,
Turkey and the United nations
. Hew York: Manhattan
Publishing Co., 1961.
Karpat, Kemal. Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a ,.
Multi-Party System
. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1959.
Kili, Suna. Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924
and 1961"; Istan))ul : Robert College Research Center,
Twr.
—
Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of llodern Turkey
. London:
Oxford University Press, 1961.
Linda, Miller. Cyprus : The Law and Politics of Civil
Strife . Cambridge: Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University, 196 R.
Ozbudun
,
Ergun . The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish
Politics . Cambridge : Center for International
Affairs, Harvard University.
Soysal, Ismail . Turkiye'nin Pis Munasebetleriyle Ilgil i
Baslica Siyasi /.ndlasmalari [The M.ajor Political
Agreements Concerning Turkey's
Stephens, Robert. Cyprus: A Place of Arms . Nev; York:
Frederick A. Praeger , 1966
.
Soylemez, Yuksel. Foreign Policy of Turkey at the United
Nations 1966-1972 . Ankara: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Press, 1973.
Tunckanat, Kaydar. Ikili Anlasmalarin Icyuzu [Inside
Information on the Bilateral Agreements] . Ankara:
Ekim Yayinevi, 1969.
Vali, Ferenc. Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign
Policy of Turkey . Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1971.
148
Vali, Ferenc. The Turkish Straits and NATO
. Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 1972.
Weiker, V7alter. The Turkish Revolution 1960-196 1. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963.
Articles
Armaoglu, Fahir. "Turkey and the United States: A New
Al liance
.
" The Turkish Yearbook of Internati nn;^ 1
Relations 1965. Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basimevi.
19G8.
» "Turk Dis Politikasinda Son Gelismeler"
[Recent Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy]
.
Dis Politika (March 1971), pp. 7-15.
Denktas
,
Rauf. "The Cyprus Problem." Foreign Policy (March
1971)
, pp. 95-100.
Gonlubol, Mehmet. "Ataturk Devrinde Turkiye'nin Dis
Politikasi" [Turkish Foreign Policy During the
Ataturk Era] . The Turkish Yearbook of International
Relations 1961
, Ankara: Ajans-Turk Press, 1963.
Harris, George. "The Role of the Military in Turkish
Politics." The Middle East Journal (Winter 1965,
Spring 1965), pp. 54-66, pp. 169-176.
Heinze, Christian. "The Cyprus Conflict: The Western
Peace System, is Put to the Test." The Turkish Year-
book of International Relations 1963 , Ankara:
Ankara University Press, 1965.
Karpat, Kemal. "Ideology in Turkey After the Revolution
of 1960." The Tur]:ish Yearbook of Internationa l
Relations 1965 , Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Basinevi,
1968.
Kurkcuoglu, Omer. "Turkey's Middle East Policy." Foreign
Policy (June 1971), pp. 93-99.
Olcay, Osman. "Turkey's Foreign Policy." Foreign Policy
(June 1971)
, pp. 79-84.
Tamkoc, Metin. "Turkey's Quest for Security Through
Defensive Alliances." The Turkish Yearbook _of_Inter-
national Relations 1961, Ankara: Ajans-Turk Press, 1963
149
Ulrnan, Haluk and Dekmejian, R. H. "Changinn Patterns of
Turkish Foreign Policy 1059-1967." The Middle East
Journal (Fall 1967), pp. 772-785.
and Tachau, Frank. "The Attempt to Reconcile
Rapid riodornization vjith Democracy." The Middle East
Journal (Spring 1965)
, pp. 153-168.
. ''Turk Dis Politikasina Yon Veren Etkenler
1923-1968" [Factors Influencing Turkish Foreign Policy
1923--1968]
. Siyasal Rilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi
(V. xxiii, No. 3) , pp. 241-273.
,
"Turk Ulusal Savunmasi Uzerine Dusunceler"
[Thoughts Concerning Turkish National Defense]
.
Siyasal Rilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi (V. xxi , No. 4),
pp. 197-225.
Periodicals and Newspapers
Dis Politika (Foreign Policy)
The Middle East Journal
Orbis
Siyasal Rilgiler Fakultesi Dergisi (Journal of the Department
~~
of Political Science)
The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations
The New York Times
Official Publications and Public Documents
Documents in The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations
1960-197T:
United Nations, General Assembly Official Records, 1960-1970.
United Nations, Security Council Official Records , 1960-1970.
U.S. Congress. House. Report by the Subcommitteg_qf_Jbhe
House Committee on Armed Services on the MUtarv
^T^Poiitical Problems in Spain, Italy ^ Libya, Turkey,
and Iran . 91st Cong., 1970.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations.
ynit_|^
S
t
ates Security Agreements and Committments Abroad.:
—Part
7~ Greece and TiirkeY.. 91st Cong., 1970.


